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Regulation and Bonding: 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by analyzing 
foreign listing behavior onto U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of 
the Act in 2002.  Using a sample of all listing events onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 1995-
2006, we develop an exchange choice model that captures firm-level, industry-level, exchange-
level and country-level listing incentives, and test whether these listing preferences changed 
following the enactment of the Act.  After controlling for firm characteristics and other economic 
determinants of these firms’ exchange choice, we find that the listing preferences of large foreign 
firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the LSE’s Main Market did not change following 
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.  In contrast, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing among 
small foreign firms choosing between the Nasdaq and LSE’s Alternative Investment Market 
decreased following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The negative effect among small firms is 
consistent with these marginal companies being less able to absorb the incremental costs 
associated with SOX compliance. The screening of smaller firms with weaker governance 
attributes from U.S. exchanges is consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by 
the Act increasing the bonding-related benefits of a U.S. listing.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act or SOX) combined with subsequent regulatory 
pronouncements mandates that U.S. registered firms adopt stricter governance practices than 
those required prior to the Act.  In this paper, we examine the economic impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley by examining listing decisions of foreign companies onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges before 
and after the enactment of the Act. As discussed in Zingales (2006), listing decisions of foreign 
companies are a good indicator of the changes in cost and benefits of listing in a specific market 
because these firms can choose from a wide range of competing alternatives – as such, foreign 
firms are effectively the “canaries in the mine shaft” when assessing the impact of new 
regulation.  While prior research examines the effect of the Act on U.S. companies (Engel, 
Hayes, and Wang, 2005; Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, 2006), minimal evidence exists on how 
foreign firms are responding to the new U.S. rules. 
Descriptive evidence shows that the rate of foreign listings onto U.S. exchanges has 
decreased in the period following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in July 2002.  One potential 
explanation for this decline is that the greater costs imposed by the Act are deterring some 
foreign firms from pursing a U.S. exchange listing.  To investigate if preferences for a U.S. 
listing have changed, we examine a foreign firm’s decision to list on either a U.S. or U.K. 
exchange before and after the Act.  To the extent that listing preferences changed, what are the 
characteristics of firms choosing to list on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in post-SOX 
period that otherwise would have listed on a U.S. exchange prior to the Act, and is the observed 
behavior consistent with the expected incremental costs and benefits of SOX?  The answers to 
these questions will shed light on the economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
A firm’s foreign listing decision depends on the relative costs and benefits generated by 
the listing.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed both the costs and benefits of a U.S. listing.  First, 
the Act increased the expected reporting, regulatory and legal costs of listing on a U.S. exchange 
(Ribstein, 2002; Romano, 2005).  If these costs are sufficiently high, some foreign firms 
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contemplating a U.S. exchange listing will opt to list their shares on an alternative exchange 
offering a similar host country institutional structure, while other firms may forgo a foreign 
listing altogether. 1  Consistent with this view, both John Thain (CEO of the NYSE) and Bob 
Greifeld (CEO of Nasdaq) have publicly expressed concern that foreign firms are bypassing U.S. 
exchanges as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Thain, 2004; Greifeld, 2006); similarly, a 
number of prominent policy reports and the U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson have 
expressed concern about the declining competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.2 
Second, despite these concerns, the impact of the Act on foreign listings is not clear 
because Sarbanes-Oxley also changed the expected benefits of a U.S. listing.  Under the legal 
bonding motivation for foreign listing decisions (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999; 2002), high quality 
firms from countries with weak institutions list their shares abroad to credibly subject themselves 
to the host country’s stricter legal and regulatory requirements.  When effective, this bonding 
process creates a commitment to adopt stronger corporate governance practices and credibly 
separates the listing firm from other firms in their home market, resulting in higher market 
valuations and lower costs of capital (e.g., Doidge, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Hail 
and Leuz, 2005).  U.S. listings traditionally serve as a credible bonding mechanism given the 
U.S.’s strong legal and regulatory environment.  Stricter corporate governance mandated by the 
Act should strengthen the credibility of U.S. listings as a bonding mechanism, thus potentially 
increasing the expected benefits from a U.S. listing.   
The response of foreign firms to the Act therefore depends upon the expected net benefits 
or costs of the Act.  If the net benefits under the Act are larger, high quality foreign firms seeking 
                                                 
1  A 2005 survey by Mazars, a Paris-based auditing firm, found that 57% of European companies surveyed believe 
the law’s costs will outweigh its benefits (Forbes, 2005).  LSE’s head of international business, Tracey Pierce’s also 
referred to companies seeking an alternative to the U.S. - “In our discussions with those companies, the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley is factoring heavily in their decision-making” (Forbes, 2005). The LSE is actively promoting its 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) as a destination for smaller foreign firms seeking to list their shares on a 
liquid exchange with strong investor protections, yet wishing to avoid the costly regulatory burdens of SOX. 
2 For example, see “Sustaining New York’s and the US’s Global and Financial Services Leadership” by Mckinsey & 
Co commissioned by Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of New York City and Charles Schumer, Senator; Interim Report 
of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation; and Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the 
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  
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a bonding platform will have a greater incentive to choose a U.S. exchange listing over credible 
alternatives following the Act. In contrast, if the new costs subsume the expected benefits, 
foreign firms may choose to forgo a U.S. exchange listing.  The net effect of the Act will thus 
depend upon the firm’s characteristics and the relative attractiveness of alternative listing options 
at a given point in time, suggesting that any impact will vary across foreign listing candidates.    
Many other factors could have led to the observed decline in U.S. listing frequency in the 
time period following SOX.  First, the types of foreign firms seeking exchange listings may have 
changed.  Second, the rise of regional exchanges may have decreased the importance of U.S. 
exchanges as a listing platform. Third, the growth of the LSE’s Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) may have increased the attractiveness of a U.K. listing.  Fourth, other contemporaneous 
events, including (but not limited to) Enron, the Global Analyst Settlement, and the E.U.’s 
mandated adoption of IFRS, may have altered foreign firms preferences for a U.S. exchange 
listing.   
To assess whether listing preferences changed as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, we need to 
compare listing activity on U.S. exchanges against the activity of an alternative exchange subject 
to similar global forces yet not subject to the Act. We select the U.K. as the comparison market 
and examine U.S. and U.K. foreign listing events between June 1995 and June 2006.  
Specifically, we model the firm’s choice between a U.S. and U.K. exchange listing and examine 
the likelihood of a U.S. listing against the U.K. alternative in the post-Act regime after 
controlling for other determinants of the exchange choice. Our research design thus focuses on a 
firm’s exchange choice given the firm’s decision to list their shares on a high quality exchange.  
This research design recognizes that managers of foreign firms (defined as non-U.S. non-U.K. 
firms) choose from a set of competing exchanges while selecting a specific foreign listing venue 
(or set of venues).   
We develop an exchange choice model that utilizes firm, industry, exchange and country-
specific factors to explain variation in the foreign firms’ listing decisions.  The merit of this 
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design is that by focusing on the exchange choice itself, we are able to identify and measure a 
broad set of factors that influence listing preferences, including the relative performance of the 
exchanges, product market incentives, geographical and cultural proximity preferences, industry 
preferences, and differences in attractiveness of the two exchanges absent the regulatory event, 
as well as capture the effect associated with possible changes in the characteristics of firms 
seeking a foreign listing and contemporaneous (with SOX) events that affect the relative 
attractiveness of U.K. and U.S. exchanges.  Importantly, by focusing our analysis on an 
observable set of listing events, we are able to examine the listing decisions of a set of smaller, 
Nasdaq-eligible firms through the hand-collection of accounting and stock price data from 
primary source documents.  Prior research finds that the impact of SOX is primarily concentrated 
among smaller firms (see Kamar et al., 2007 for a survey); hence, any analysis that excludes 
small firms will miss the set of firms where the effect of SOX is likely to be the strongest.  We 
also hand-collect additional explanatory variables, such as firm-level governance attributes (e.g., 
use of a high or low quality auditor), that are not readily available through machine-readable 
databases yet are directly related to both the firm’s listing decision and the potential cost of SOX 
compliance. 
We focus on the U.K. alternative because of its position as the leading, alternative capital 
market for foreign listings.3  Additionally, U.K. exchanges offer investor protections and 
shareholder rights that compare favorably to the U.S. exchange environment.4  Lastly, the LSE 
has been characterized by both policy makers and the press as a likely recipient of “lost” U.S. 
listings following SOX, and the LSE actively promotes itself as an alternative listing platform for 
firms seeking an exchange with strong liquidity and investor protections without the regulatory 
burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
                                                 
3 The LSE ranks second in number of foreign equity listings behind U.S. exchanges.  As of June 30th, 2006, 780 
foreign firms were listed on U.S. exchanges (NYSE + Nasdaq), while 591 foreign firms were listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (Main Market + AIM).  (Source: International Federation of World Exchanges).  
4 The LSE actively promotes the “equivalence” of U.S. and U.K. legal and regulatory institutions.  Consistent with 
those arguments, survey data ranking country-level legal and regulatory institutions suggests that these countries 
have functionally equivalent institutional arrangements (e.g., LaPorta et al. 1998; 2006). 
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Our exchange choice model captures significant variation in cross-sectional incentives for 
a U.S. versus U.K. listing. Consistent with prior research, we find that firms are drawn to 
particular exchanges on the basis of geographic and industrial characteristics.  At the exchange 
level, we find that foreign firms are more likely to choose an exchange that has greater liquidity 
and higher market valuations at the time of the listing.  We also find that U.S. exchanges are 
more likely to attract larger firms and firms that raise equity in the host market, and are less 
likely to attract firms from countries with relatively weaker institutions (i.e., code law countries 
and emerging markets) and firms with weaker governance as reflected by their auditor choice.  
Finally, we show that time-series variation in the relative attractiveness of U.S. and U.K. 
exchanges (for example growth in LSE’s AIM), explains variation in the U.S. – U.K. listing 
decision over the time frame of our study. 
After controlling for firm characteristics and other economic determinants, our tests 
produce two main SOX-related conclusions. First, among large foreign firms choosing between a 
U.S. exchange and the LSE’s Main Market, listing preferences did not change following SOX.   
Thus, for a set of large, foreign firms likely seeking a U.S. listing for bonding purposes, we find 
that the attractiveness of U.S. markets has not changed (and may potentially have slightly 
increased) following the enactment of SOX.  Specifically, we find no evidence of a change in 
listing preferences among NYSE-eligible firms, and find a marginal increase in the likelihood of 
a U.S. listing among firms choosing between the NASDAQ and the LSE’s Main Market. This 
inference and related conclusion is confirmed by Doidge et al. (2007)’s analysis of U.S. listing 
decisions around SOX for their global sample of similarly-sized foreign firms.   
Second, among smaller foreign firms eligible to choose between the Nasdaq and LSE’s 
AIM, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing has declined following SOX.  This decline 
exists after controlling for changes in the characteristics of firms seeking foreign listings, 
changes in relative exchange performance (prices, liquidity, returns) following the Act, changes 
in the attractiveness of U.S. markets absent the effect of SOX, and changes in the attractiveness 
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of AIM.  Related research by Doidge et al. (2007) does not conduct a Nasdaq – AIM 
comparison; as such, this analysis, driven by our inclusion of hand collected data for smaller 
firms, represents a unique contribution of our paper to the literature.  The documentation of a 
negative SOX effect among smaller, Nasdaq-eligible foreign firms is consistent with small, less 
profitable firms being unable to absorb the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance.  
Thus, similar to extant research on U.S. companies, (Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2005; Leuz, 
Triantis and Wang, 2006; Kamar et al., 2007), we find that the adverse effects of SOX on foreign 
listing decisions is limited to these smaller firms.  Whether the loss of these small companies to 
AIM is economically meaningful is a subjective assessment. 
The remainder of the paper seeks to better understand how foreign listing activity has 
changed in the time period following SOX.  Results suggest that the determinants of a U.S. 
listing (versus the U.K. alternative) have changed.  Some of these changes reflect the impact of 
contemporaneous non-SOX events.  For example, E.U. firms have greater likelihood of listing in 
London in the post-SOX period likely reflecting the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. 
which lowered the relative cost of a U.K. listing. Similarly, the growth in AIM reflected in the 
increase in domestic AIM listings has led to incrementally greater likelihood of a London listing 
during the post-SOX period.  Thus, even absent SOX, U.S. listing activity would have changed.  
Other changes, such as an increased sensitivity of listing decisions to firm size and a greater 
likelihood of firms from code law countries listing on U.S. exchanges, are consistent with post-
Act listing determinants reflecting a shift in both the expected costs and benefits of a U.S. listing.   
To explore the preceding analysis further, we use a prediction model based on pre-SOX 
data to predict an exchange listing choice after the Act.  This analysis reveals three key findings.  
First, the type of firms seeking listings has changed. Nearly one-half of the observed decline in 
the mix of U.S. and U.K. listings in the post-SOX period can be explained by firms self-selecting 
listing venues on the basis of their innate characteristics and pre-Act listing preferences alone. 
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Second, after controlling for these self-selection tendencies, the foreign firms identified 
as having bypassed U.S. exchanges in favor of the LSE, and specifically AIM, are smaller and 
less profitable than the firms that actually listed on comparable U.S. exchanges, are more likely 
to employ a non-Big 5 auditor, and are disproportionately domiciled in developed countries.  
These characteristics coincide with the types of foreign firms that are less able to absorb the 
Act’s incremental costs or garner the smallest benefit from a U.S. listing.  In aggregate, these 
firms account for approximately $36.5 billion in market capitalization.   
Third, our methodology also identifies a small set of firms that listed on U.S. exchanges 
following SOX but were predicted to list in London based on their characteristics.  These firms 
are larger and more profitable than the average U.K. listing and account for approximately $24.6 
billion in additional market capitalization.  Moreover, nearly all of these firms are domiciled in 
emerging markets, consistent with large, high quality firms from countries with weak institutions 
wanting to capture the enhanced bonding and reputation benefits of a U.S. listing following 
SOX. Whether the gains from these new emerging market listings outweigh the benefits forfeited 
by the loss of small firms from primarily developed economies is an open question. 
Despite the robustness of our empirical results, we note two caveats.  First, inferring 
causality from an event study of this nature is difficult, due to the likely presence of confounding 
factors, such as the corporate events that lead to the creation of the legislation and other 
correlated time-period specific events.  To mitigate this concern, our tests include controls for the 
expected determinants of this listing decision, including a variable correlated with foreign firms’ 
preferences for a U.S. listing absent the effect of SOX (Level I and IV ADR listing rates) and a 
variable that captures changes in the attractiveness of AIM as a listing venue (growth in domestic 
AIM listings).  However, despite these controls, caution in interpreting our results remains.5  
Second, we examine the set of firms that have chosen to list on a U.S. or London exchange (i.e., 
                                                 
5 Despite this caveat, a failure to document a change in foreign listing preferences following SOX would have cast 
considerable doubt on either the arguments that the Act has changed the cost and benefits for foreign firms to list on 
U.S. exchanges or the validity of the bonding hypothesis as an explanation for cross-listing behavior. 
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observable events), treating this sample as exogenously determined and focusing our empirical 
analysis on the exchange choice. Our research design does not identify firms that would have 
otherwise listed in the U.S. absent the requirements of the Act but instead chose to (a) never list 
on a foreign exchange, (b) opt for an OTC listing or private placement instead of an exchange 
listing, or (c) listed on an alternative, non-U.K., international exchange. As such, our study 
investigates only one channel by which SOX potentially influenced foreign listing activity. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses background 
information on SOX and the expected impact of the Act on foreign listings.  Section 3 outlines 
our data collection procedure and the research design, Section 4 provides descriptive evidence of 
listing patterns, section 5 presents our main empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and motivation 
2.1 Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Foreign Issuers 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on July 30th 2002 and its provisions covered 
all SEC reporting companies.  No exception was made for foreign issuers, except companies 
with Level I and Level IV American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which do not have SEC 
reporting requirements.6  During the deliberations leading up to the final passage of the Act, 
there were some attempts to exempt foreign firms from the provisions of the Act, in keeping with 
historical precedents for foreign firms; however, as implemented, all provisions of the Act are 
applicable to foreign issuers with SEC reporting requirements.7   
The Act does not provide flexibility for the SEC to interpret legislative intent and to 
allow exemptions to foreign issuers except in the case of rules relating to the audit committee 
                                                 
6 These companies do not have to comply with mandatory U.S. disclosure rules. Instead, under Rule 12g3-2, these 
firms are required to file with the SEC the same financial information that they file with their home country 
regulators or stock exchanges.  
7 For example, foreign reporting entities are exempt from the requirement to file proxy statements, reporting of 
insider transactions, filing of quarterly reports, or compliance with Regulation FD. The lack of exemption for 
foreign issuers under SOX was not inadvertent – See comments by Harvey Pitt, Chairman SEC at the SEC 
Roundtables on Auditor Independence and Attorney Conduct, December 17, 2002 (Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/audindtrans121702.htm#ai) 
 9
(Perino, 2003).8  For example, on August 2nd, 2002, the SEC issued its proposed rules – 
Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports - as required under 
Section 302 of the Act.  Consistent with the lack of flexibility, the new rules provided no 
exemptions for foreign issuers and specifically emphasized that the “no exemption” policy is 
required under the Act.  However, the SEC has retained some flexibility in the timetable to 
implement the various provisions of the Act.  In particular, the SEC first extended the due date 
for non-accelerated filers and foreign private issuers for compliance with Section 404 to the first 
fiscal year ending after July 15, 2005 and subsequently extended it again by another year for 
foreign accelerated filers to the first fiscal year ending after July 15, 2006 and for foreign non-
accelerated filers to the first fiscal year ending after July 15, 2007 (SEC release No. 33-618 dated 
Sept. 22, 2005); the corresponding compliance date for large U.S companies was the first fiscal 
year ending after November 15, 2004.9,10   
 
2.2 Expected impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the costs and benefits of a U.S. listing 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed both the expected costs and benefits of a 
foreign U.S. listing.  From a cost perspective, the Act increases both the expected direct and 
indirect costs of a foreign listing.  Because the implications of the Act for foreign issuers are the 
same as those for U.S. corporations, many of the concerns raised by foreign issuers are similar to 
those raised by U.S companies.  In particular, the requirement for CEO and CFO certification of 
financial statements (and the attendant civil and criminal liabilities), the internal control 
requirements under Section 404 (which are considered costly to implement particularly for 
smaller firms), the prohibition of loans to officers and directors, and the inspection of foreign 
                                                 
8 SEC has allowed accommodation of home country regulations that would create audit committees equivalent in 
independence to that envisaged under the U.S. rules – for instance, German firms are allowed to include labor 
representatives on the audit committee.  
9 For parsimony, we will forego a discussion of the various provisions of the Act.  See Perino (2003), Coates (2007) 
and Kamar et al. (2007) for a good summary and discussion of the Act’s key provisions. 
10 Non-accelerated filers are essentially firms with market value < $ 75 Million. For a more complete definition see 
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 or footnote 5 of SEC Release No. 33-8618. 
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auditors by the PCAOB are highlighted as some of the Act’s more onerous provisions for foreign 
companies (Pozen, 2004). Corporate executives complain that complying with the Act diverts 
top management attention away from business issues and towards compliance with rules and has 
led to greater risk aversion due to fears of personal liability (Solomon and Bryan-Low, 2004; 
Thain, 2004). If these concerns are valid and the Act solely raises the cost of a foreign listing, we 
would expect to see fewer firms choosing a U.S. exchange listing and subjecting themselves to 
the provisions of the Act, especially in the presence of a credible listing alternative. 
Prior research suggests that SEC requirements can impose costs that deter foreign firms 
from choosing U.S exchanges as a listing venue.  For example, Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) 
and Saudagaran and Biddle (1992; 1995) show that mandatory disclosure requirements 
significantly affect firm’s choice of foreign listing venues.11  Similarly, Mittoo (1992) surveys 
Canadian companies and finds that SEC reporting and compliance requirements are considered 
to be the greatest costs of a U.S. listing. 
However, the incremental costs of the Act may be insufficient to deter a U.S. listing.  
First, even though the Act’s requirements will result in substantial direct costs (for example, the 
implementation of Section 404), these costs are likely to be economically insignificant for the 
large companies that typically seek a U.S. listing.  Instead, SOX-related compliance costs are 
expected to be more onerous for small firms and firms with poor internal controls and weak 
corporate governance practices.  
Second, the indirect costs associated with SOX may be immaterial for foreign firms.  
Siegel (2004) provides evidence that the SEC and minority investors have not effectively 
enforced U.S. regulations and laws against cross-listed foreign firms.  As such, the expected 
costs of the Act may be lower for foreign firms than their U.S. counterparts.  Additionally, many 
of the provisions of the Act are not incremental to existing statutes relating to criminal behavior 
                                                 
11 For example, Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) examine the listing decisions of 207 companies from eight countries.  
Using a self-constructed measure of required disclosure, they find that their disclosure measure is negatively 
associated with a company’s decision to list in a particular country, consistent with strict disclosure requirements 
inhibiting cross-border listings. 
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by corporate executives (Perino 2003).  For example, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
requires SEC registrants to maintain a strong internal control system and has been cited in a 
number of SEC Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases against companies since 1977 
(Rouse, 2006).12  As such, the indirect costs under SOX may not be incremental to the existing 
cost structure in place, and fears of increased legal liability exposure may be unfounded.13   
Third, firms may continue to opt for a U.S. listing simply because the benefits continue to 
outweigh any new costs (i.e., the demand for a U.S. listing is inelastic).  Pagano, Roell, and 
Zechner (2002) identify a number of motives for firms to cross-list – to raise capital for 
investment, to use cross-listed stock as a currency for foreign acquisitions, to facilitate stock 
sales by existing shareholders, to broaden the shareholder base, to access foreign expertise (such 
as industry-specific analysts), to demonstrate a commitment to better disclosure and governance 
standards, to increase share liquidity, to take advantage of relative mispricing, to capitalize on 
product market reputation, and to strengthen the company’s output market.  Through many of 
these channels, the U.S. listing generates a benefit in the form of a reduced cost of capital and an 
increased equity valuation (e.g., Karolyi, 1998; Stulz, 1999; Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 
2004).14  Additionally, given that the U.S. product market is one of the largest in the world, the 
product and labor market benefits of listing in the U.S. will not be available through listing on 
exchanges in other countries.15 To the extent that the expected benefits of a U.S. listing continue 
                                                 
12 As illustrated in Coates (2007), the criminal prosecutions in Enron, Tyco and Worldcom enforced laws in place 
before Sarbanes-Oxley. 
13 However, enforcement by the SEC may now be more vigorous than before and managers may alter their listing 
behavior because the expected probability of enforcement action has changed. 
14 Blass and Yafeh (2001) show that high-tech and fast growing firms from Israel and the Netherlands list 
exclusively in the U.S as their primary exchange because U.S. investors and analysts possess greater expertise at 
valuing such companies than their domestic counterparts. 
15 Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) find that firms that have product and labor market interactions with the 
U.S. (and firms from countries that have greater product and labor market interactions with the U.S.) behave similar 
to U.S. firms as measured by their disclosure practices compared to those that do not have such interactions. That 
paper interprets such voluntary behavior as resulting from the demand for information from product markets 
(suppliers, customers) and the labor market (current or potential employees). This effect is incremental to that from a 
U.S. listing and is similar in magnitude to the effect that arises from a U.S. listing. 
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to exceed the new cost structure under Sarbanes-Oxley, foreign firms may continue to prefer a 
U.S. listing after the Act. 
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley may have actually increased the benefits of a U.S. exchange 
listing.  The poor protection of minority shareholders impedes the growth of financial markets 
(e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; 2000; 2002, among others). Coffee (1999; 2002) and Stulz (1999) 
suggest that foreign firms can overcome the weakness of their home country institutions by 
listing in the U.S. and using the U.S. legal system to protect minority shareholders.  Under the 
bonding hypothesis, a U.S. exchange listing provides the commitment mechanism for these 
companies to bond to a high quality legal and regulatory system; this legal bonding results in 
higher market valuations and lower cost of capital, with the benefits being larger for foreign 
firms from countries with weaker legal institutions (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Doidge, 
2004; Hail and Luez, 2005; Lel and Miller, 2006). By raising the level of compliance required, 
Sarbanes-Oxley may have increased the credibility of U.S. exchanges as a bonding mechanism, 
thereby increasing the expected bonding-related benefits of a U.S. listing.16,17  Moreover, in the 
absence of other jurisdictions offering a similar bonding mechanism, companies may have no 
choice but to list on U.S. stock exchanges.18 
 
2.3 Prior research and the contribution of paper 
Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act likely changed both the costs and benefits of a U.S. 
listing, the impact of the Act on foreign listing decisions is an empirical issue.  Our paper is 
                                                 
16 U.S. stock exchanges are also positioning themselves to benefit from this reputation. Nasdaq has newly created, 
effective July 1st, 2006, the Nasdaq Global Select Market for “public companies that meet the highest listing 
standards in the world” (Nasdaq, 2006). This tier imposes higher initial listing standards than those applicable to the 
other two tiers – Nasdaq Global Markets (formerly the Nasdaq National Market) and the Nasdaq Capital Market 
(formerly the Nasdaq SmallCap Market). 
17 Consistent with these arguments, the CEO of WNS (Holdings) Limited, a firm that recently went public on the 
NYSE, wrote a Wall Street Journal article touting the advantages of a U.S. cross listing and specifically highlighting 
the advantages of the Act in improving corporate governance (Bhargava, 2006). 
18 Other locations offering strong investor protections may provide bonding benefits similar to the U.S. For example, 
Crawford and Piotroski (2006) find that exchanges other than the U.S. which offer a functionally equivalent 
improvement in investor protections upon cross-listing are capable of creating incentives for better financial 
reporting and governance practices. Thus, firms seeking bonding benefits are not necessarily tied to a U.S. listing. 
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closely related to a stream of research examining the impact of the Act on U.S. companies. This 
research documents an increase in the number of firms deregistering from the SEC (Leuz, 
Triantis and Wang, 2006) and an increase in the number of firms going private (Engel, Hayes 
and Wang, 2005; Block, 2004) following SOX.  Additionally, Kamar et al., (2006) examine U.S. 
acquisition targets and find that a greater propensity for targets to be acquired by private 
acquirers than by public acquirers in the post-Act period.  Finally, Kamar et al. (2007) review a 
number of studies that examine the impact of SOX on U.S. companies and conclude that the 
costs imposed by SOX are greater for small firms.  These findings provide evidence consistent 
with the views of the critics of the Act that SOX has raised the net costs of being public, with the 
burden being especially onerous for smaller firms (Romano, 2005; Ribstein, 2002).  
Contemporaneous research has found similar effects among foreign firms. Litvak (2007) 
shows that foreign firms listed in the U.S. experienced a significant negative price reaction to 
news that the Act would apply to them.  Marosi and Massoud (2006) find an increase in 
deregistrations among foreign firms following Sarbanes-Oxley.  In particular, 96 foreign firms 
deregistered with the SEC from 2002-2005 while only 22 firms deregistered in all the years from 
1990 to 2001.  Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys and Yang (2007) examine the characteristics of foreign 
firms that have voluntarily delisted following the Act, and find that these firms tend to have 
weaker corporate governance attributes than a control sample.   
Our paper is closely related to Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) (DKS henceforth) who 
examine U.S. listing patterns between 1990 and 2005.  Focusing on a global sample of publicly-
traded foreign firms covered by the Worldscope database, DKS confirm one of our principle 
findings: after controlling for differences in the type of firm seeking a foreign listing, Sarbanes-
Oxley did not impact U.S. listing activity among large foreign firms.  Consistent with Sarbanes-
Oxley not materially changing the net cost/benefit structure of a U.S. exchange listing for these 
large firms, DKS show that the relative valuation benefits associated with a U.S. listing have not 
changed following the enactment of SOX. 
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Unlike DKS, who model the likelihood of foreign firms choosing or not choosing to list 
on a U.S. exchange, we model the firm choice between alternative exchanges given the decision 
to engage in a foreign listing.  Our approach allows us to consider a more comprehensive set of 
incentives for a U.S. exchange listing.  And, unlike DKS, the approach also allows us to include 
in our sample small firms that are not present in the Worldscope database.  By hand-collecting 
data on these small firms, we are able to search for the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley among those 
firms that ex ante are most likely to be affected by the incremental costs of the regulation.   
More importantly, relative to DKS, our approach is an alternative representation of how 
SOX impacts firm-level listing decisions.  Given the decision to engage in a foreign listing, 
managers must select a listing venue.  This decision will focus on identifying the exchange that 
offers the largest net benefit to the firm.  These benefits could be related to bonding, but could 
also reflect the desire for a liquid stock market, an informed investor base or product market 
benefits.  These benefits are weighed against the relative costs associated with each respective 
exchange listing.  In the context of this specific decision, we focus on the U.S. versus London 
listing decision, and seek to determine whether the London Stock Exchange is attracting foreign 
firms in the post-Act period that would have otherwise listed on a U.S exchange prior to the Act?   
We examine the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as an alternative to the two U.S. 
exchanges because the LSE has been highlighted as an alternate destination for companies 
interested in accessing western capital markets (Karmin and Lucchetti, 2006; McLachlan, 2006).  
The LSE is an attractive alternative to potential U.S. listing candidates because U.K. institutions 
provide strong investor protections (e.g., LaPorta et al. 1998; 2006), yet offer listing firms 
flexible corporate governance standards under the Combined Code.  Moreover, while some 
companies may have opted for other regional exchanges, London has traditionally been the 
largest cross-listing destination other than the U.S. (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004).  A recent 
London Stock Exchange survey of 80 companies that listed on that exchange found that 90% of 
those companies that contemplated a U.S. listing decided that Sarbanes-Oxley Act made London 
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more attractive (Review and Outlook, Wall Street Journal, Feb 8, 2006).  The London Stock 
Exchange has actively used SOX-related costs to discourage firms from a U.S. listing and 
highlighted the avoidance of these costs as a reason to choose a U.K. listing; the LSE’s AIM has 
undertaken extensive marketing efforts aimed at smaller companies and is holding road shows at 
major U.S. financial centers to attract foreign listings (McLachlan, 2006).19 Lastly, the heads of 
the NYSE and NASDAQ acknowledge that firms choose among global exchanges, and that the 
loss of foreign listings to alternative exchanges is one likely impact of SOX. 
 
3. Sample construction and data sources 
Our sample consists of foreign firms that listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and London Stock 
Exchange between June 1st, 1995 and June 30th, 2006.  We chose June 1995 as the starting point 
of our sample period because this date marked the launch of London’s AIM.  To construct our 
sample, we gathered a list of currently listed foreign companies (including listing date) from 
each exchange’s website.  These current lists were then supplemented to identify companies that 
listed in our sample time period but have subsequently delisted from the exchange (and hence, 
are not included on the exchange’s list of active companies).  For both the NYSE and Nasdaq, 
we supplement their current lists using data provided to us directly by the exchange, as well as 
ADR data from the Citibank, Bank of New York and JP Morgan ADR databases and also CRSP 
and Bloomberg.  The London Stock Exchange website also provides detailed data on historical 
listings for AIM since its inception in June 1995, allowing us to identify delisted firms for the 
entire sample period.  Detailed historical listings data for the London Stock Exchange’s Main 
market are available only from January 1998. In order to identify listings between 1995-1997 
that have subsequently delisted, we supplement our 1995-1997 data for the Main market using 
the new companies list from the Official London Stock Exchange Directory for the relevant 
historical years, and collect listing dates for these companies from Datastream.  Finally, we 
                                                 
19 Our interview with the audit committee chairman of a large Korean cross listed company indicated that SOX 
weighs heavily on companies’ choice between a U.S. and U.K. listing.   
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excluded any foreign company that is either an investment fund or an investment trust for all 
exchanges in our analysis.  
Together, these data collection procedures have allowed us to obtain a comprehensive 
dataset of foreign listings on these exchanges over our sample period. These procedures 
identified 1,503 unique listing events undertaken by firms from 82 countries over our sample 
period.  These listings are split nearly two to one between U.S. (976) and U.K. (527) exchanges.  
Appendix One tabulates the distribution of the home countries for the full sample of listing 
events, for the two host countries separately, and for the respective exchanges. 
 Financial accounting, stock price and auditor data are primarily gathered through the 
Datastream database.  For firms with missing price and/or accounting data on Datastream in the 
year of the listing event, we gather supplemental accounting and price data through Compustat’s 
North American Industrial, Global and Emerging Markets, and Global Issues databases.  
Additional accounting, stock price and auditor data are hand collected from corporate filings 
with the SEC and LSE in the year of listing.  From these various sources, complete financial and 
stock price data are available for 1,248 cross-listing events.  Data on stock exchange indices 
(levels and returns) and market pricing multiples are primarily gathered through Datastream.  
Data on domestic listing activity are gathered from the respective exchange.  Data on the total 
number of domestic firms listed on a given exchange each year and monthly trading volume are 
gathered from the World Federation of Exchanges. 
 
4. Descriptive Evidence 
4.1 Descriptive statistics of foreign firms listing on U.S. and U.K. exchanges 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample.  In terms of financial attributes, the 
average firm listing onto a U.S. or U.K. exchange over the sample period tends to be large 
(market capitalization, total assets, and total revenue of $3.3 billion, $10.9 billion, and $2.4 
billion, respectively), profitable (median net income as a percent of assets of 2.4 percent), and 
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possessing moderate growth prospects (median book-to-market ratio of 0.404).  However, there 
is considerable variation in these characteristics.  For example, for those firms with available 
financial data, 66.9 percent, 61.9 percent, and 70.8 percent have a market capitalization, total 
asset base, and total revenue of less than five hundred million dollars (median values of $219 
million, $248 million, and $118 million, respectively), while 39.1 percent of the sample is 
unprofitable in the year of listing.  Lastly, 37.5 percent of the listings involved the raising of 
equity capital; 33.1 percent of these firms raised capital in the host country, while 8.1 percent 
raised capital in the home markets around the time of the foreign listing.   
 In terms of home country attributes, 66.4 percent, 29.2 percent, and 4.4 percent of the 
firms are domiciled in economies with a common law, code law, and socialist/communist legal 
tradition, respectively, while 42.5 percent of the firms are domiciled in developing economies.  
The listing companies also display considerable geographic dispersion; for example, 25.8 percent 
of the sample was domiciled in a member nation of the European Union at the time of the cross-
listing, while 10.7 percent, 10.0 percent, 6.2 percent, and 12.6 percent of the sample are from 
Asia, Africa/Middle East, Latin/South America and Caribbean nations.   
 Consistent with firm’s self-selecting onto exchanges, there is considerable variation in 
these firms’ financial and institutional properties across the exchanges.  As the two bigger 
domestic exchanges, both the NYSE and the LSE’s Main Market attract larger and more 
profitable firms than the NASDAQ and the LSE’s AIM, respectively.  In contrast, the NASDAQ 
and AIM attract firms with stronger market valuations and greater expected growth opportunities 
than the NYSE and Main Market (as implied by the firms’ book-to-market ratios).  However, 
despite the broad similarities between NASDAQ and AIM, the NASDAQ attracts substantially 
larger and relatively more profitable firms than AIM.  Finally, in terms of home country 
institutions, firms from emerging markets and socialist/communist legal traditions have a 
marginally stronger preference for a U.K. listing.  
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 Panel B presents evidence on the industry affiliations of the cross-listed firms. 
Interestingly, the NASDAQ and AIM attract firms from very different industries. Over the full 
sample period, nearly 40 percent of all NASDAQ cross-listings are firms from either 
Software/Technology or Biotech/ Pharmaceutical sector, while these same sectors account for 
less than 15% of all AIM listings.  In contrast, nearly 40 percent of all AIM listings occur in the 
Oil and Gas, Chemicals and Forestry/Mining/Metals sectors, while this sector accounts for only 
10% of NASDAQ listing activity.  Lastly, the NYSE and LSE Main Market host more 
comparable portfolio of firms, with financial service firms (e.g., banks, insurance companies) 
accounting for the largest portion of total listing for each exchange (18.75% and 25% 
respectively).  Our multivariate tests will control for these industry-level preferences using 
industry indicator variables. 
 
4.2 Descriptive evidence on foreign listing activity on U.S. and U.K. exchanges 
 Table 2 presents descriptive evidence on the trends in foreign listing activity over the 
period June 1995 to June 2006 and for the two sub-periods before and after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Our pre-Act baseline period (PreSOX) spans June 1995 to April 2002.  The 
post Sarbanes-Oxley period (PostSOX) consists of the forty-seven month period from August 
2002 through June 2006.  All analyses exclude the three month legislative timeframe of the Act 
(May 2002 through July 2002).  
 The first column of Table 2 presents the aggregate trend in foreign listing activity.  Over 
the entire sample period, an average of 11.30 foreign listings occurred each month onto either a 
U.S. or U.K. exchange, with 64.9% of those listings occurring on a U.S. exchange (7.34 in U.S. 
versus 3.96 listings in U.K. per month).  In terms of listing trends, there is a decrease in the 
aggregate listing rate following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 12.27 listings per month prior to the Act 
and 9.87 listing per month following the Act.   
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The remaining columns present listing trends by host markets and the underlying 
exchanges.  Monthly listing activity on the NASDAQ, the NYSE and the LSE’s Main Market 
has significantly declined over the last forty-four months compared to the pre-Act period.  In 
contrast, the LSE’s AIM has experienced a nearly 775 percent increase in monthly listings.  
These time-series trends continue to persist after considering controls for variation in market 
valuation-related factors over this time period (not tabulated). All of the tabulated changes are 
statistically significant at the one-percent level (two-tailed tests).  
 
5 Results: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the probability of a U.S. versus U.K. listing 
5.1 Empirical model 
 In order to assess whether a change in listing preferences has occurred, we compare 
listing activity on U.S. exchanges against the activity of an alternative exchange not subject to 
the Act.  As discussed earlier, the U.K.’s prominence as a global capital market makes a listing 
on the London Stock Exchange a viable substitute to a U.S. listing.  We model the firm’s choice 
between a U.S. and U.K. exchange listing, and examine the likelihood of a U.S. listing against 
the U.K. alternative in the post-Act regime after controlling for other determinants of the listing 
exchange choice. Specifically, we estimate variations of the following cross-sectional model: 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU 
+ β5Emerging + β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_Index  
+ β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList + β12log(1+NonExchUSList)  
+ β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Issuance_Host + β15Diff_Trade  
+ β16log(Assets) + β17ROA + β18log(1+BTM) + β19PostSOX + ε                        (2) 
 
In this model, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the event 
pertains to a foreign listing onto a U.S. exchange (NASDAQ or NYSE), and zero if the firm lists 
on the LSE (Main Market or AIM).   
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The independent variables are designed to capture factors that influence a given firm to 
list onto a specific exchange.  Prior empirical research provides little guidance on the forces 
shaping a firm’s exchange choice.  As such, a notable contribution of this paper is the estimation 
of an explicit exchange choice model.  We incorporate explanatory variables that cover three 
broad areas: home country attributes, exchange-level attributes, and firm-specific factors. 
The first set of explanatory variables captures incentives created by the firm’s home 
country and related institutions.  First, the listing choice will influenced by proximity and/or 
economic interdependencies between home and host countries.  As noted by Pagano, Roell and 
Zechner (2002) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004), both geographic and cultural proximity are key 
factors influencing cross-listing decisions.  To capture these country-level effects, we include 
three indicator variables, Canada, Ireland and Israel, to capture the idiosyncratic listing 
tendencies of firms domiciled in Canada, Ireland and Israel, respectively.  These three countries 
are individually identified because (1) these countries provide the largest number of foreign (i.e., 
non-US and non-UK) firms in the sample and (2) each country has strong economic links with 
either the U.S. (Canada and Israel) or U.K (Ireland).  Similarly, the indicator variable EU is set 
equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country that belongs to the European Union at the time 
of the listing event.  This variable is included to capture any incentives created by the economic 
links between EU member states and the U.K.20  Geography is an array of indicator variables for 
three broad geographic regions in our sample: Asia, South America and Caribbean.  These 
indicator variables are designed capture any distinct preferences arising from geographic or 
cultural factors in these regions.  Lastly, the variable Diff_Trade is included to capture relative 
differences in the level of product market interactions between the firm’s home country and the 
U.S. and U.K. respectively.  Diff_Trade is measured as the sum of imports and exports between 
                                                 
20 Additionally, the recognition of IFRS by U.K. exchanges coupled with the mandatory adoption of IFRS by the 
E.U. (adopted 2001; compliance mandated in 2005) could also lead to a shift in listing preferences among E.U. 
domiciled firms towards a U.K. listing over time.   
 21
the home country and the U.S. minus the sum of imports and exports between the home country 
and the U.K., scaled by the home country’s GDP, in the year of listing.21  
Second, the listing choice is likely to be influenced by the firm’s home country 
institutional structure and the resultant legal, political, regulatory and financial reporting 
incentives these institutions create.  Prior research shows that these institutions are correlated 
with the country’s legal tradition, with stronger institutions residing in countries with a common 
law legal tradition (e.g., LaPorta et al. 1998).  So we include two indicator variables, CodeLaw 
and Socialist, to indicate whether the firm resides in a country with a code law or socialist / 
communist legal tradition, respectively. Similarly, developing countries have weaker institutions 
and a greater degree of government intervention, corruption and cronyism than developed 
economies. The indicator variable Emerging equals one if the firm’s host country is not 
classified as a developed economy by the World Bank.  To the extent that weak institutions 
create incentives to avoid regimes with stronger regulatory or investor scrutiny, we expect 
negative relations between these independent variables and a U.S. listing; in contrast, firms from 
countries with weak institutions also have the most to gain from a U.S. listing under the bonding 
hypothesis, suggesting a positive relation between these variables and a U.S. listing.22  
 The second set of explanatory variables captures incentives arising from differences in 
market conditions and relative attractiveness of a stock exchange around the time of the listing.  
We consider four exchange level measures: differences in twelve-month index returns, 
differences in market-level price-earnings multiples, differences in market liquidity, and 
differences in domestic listing activity.  Prior research suggests that domestic equity issuance 
decisions are influenced by relative market valuations, shifts in expected returns and changes in 
                                                 
21 Trade data for the U.S. are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(www.bea.gov) and for the U.K. are from the Office for National Statistics, (www.statistics.gov.uk). 
22 Results are also robust to the inclusion of the additional variables to capture potential country-level incentives.  
For example, we included an indicator variable if the firm is domiciled in a current or former U.S. territory (i.e., 
Puerto Rico and the Marshall Islands).  We also included an indicator variable if the firm is domiciled in an off-
shore tax haven (Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey) or Netherlands Antilles).  Due 
to the limited number of observations for these categories, we exclude them from the tabulated results. 
 22
expectations about the payoffs to future investments (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2005).  If similar 
incentives exist for foreign listing decisions, foreign firms are likely to be drawn to exchanges 
providing strong recent index performance, high valuation multiples and greater liquidity. 
For each exchange, the preceding twelve-month return to the respective exchange’s 
market index is measured (Index_Returnt).  For the NYSE and NASDAQ, IndexReturn is 
measured using the return to the respective exchange’s composite index.  For the LSE’s Main 
Market and AIM, IndexReturn is measured using the return to the FTSE-350 and the FTSE AIM-
All share index respectively.23  Diff_IndexReturnt is the difference in IndexReturnt between a 
given U.S. exchange and the corresponding U.K. alternative.   
Analogously, Diff_P/E_Indext is the relative difference in pricing premium, as implied by 
the exchange’s current pricing multiple P/E_Indext, between a U.S. exchange and the 
corresponding U.K. exchange.  P/E_Index is the respective exchange’s market-level price-
earnings multiple in the month of listing.  This variable is designed to capture the relative level of 
market valuations on a given exchange at the time of the listing decision.  For the NASDAQ and 
Main Market, P/E_Index is the implied market P/E multiple for the Nasdaq composite and the 
FTSE-350 index, respectively.  For the AIM, P/E_Index is the market P/E multiple reported for 
Datastream’s U.K. Small Cap index.  Finally, for the NYSE, P/E_index is measured as the 
weighted average P/E ratio for all listed firms with CRSP data in the listing month.24  Together, 
Diff_IndexReturns and Diff_P/E_Index are expected to capture differences in market momentum 
and valuation levels prior to the exchange choice.   
To capture differences in relative market liquidity and trading volume, the variable 
Diff_Liquidity is measured as the value of shares traded (scaled by the exchange’s market 
                                                 
23 Returns to the AIM All-share index are supplemented with the returns to the FTSE Small Cap index prior to 
December 1996. 
24 Our measure P/E_Indext is measured using a different data source for each exchange (and is potentially computed 
using different weighting techniques). As such, Diff_P/E_Indext is mean-adjusted when included in our empirical 
models to better capture time-series variation in relative pricing attributes across exchanges.   
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capitalization) on a specific U.S. exchange less the value of shares traded on the London Stock 
Exchange in the month of the foreign listing.25   
Pagano et al. (2002) provide anecdotal evidence that foreign firms are attracted to 
exchanges experiencing a strong, contemporaneous growth in new domestic listings.  To capture 
this effect, we include the variable Diff_DomesticListt, measured as the difference in the number 
of new domestic firms listing on a specific U.S. and U.K. exchange (DomesticListt) in the month 
of the foreign listing.  We expect Diff_DomesticListt to act as an instrument for omitted 
exchange-level factors and events that influence the relative attractiveness of one exchange over 
another.  This control is critically important given the increased attractiveness of AIM as a listing 
venue for both domestic and foreign over the last several years of our study. 
Finally, we recognize that factors other than Sarbanes-Oxley can alter foreign firms’ 
preferences for a U.S. or U.K. listing over time.  First, to control for changes in the attractiveness 
of U.S. exchanges absent the effect of SOX, we include the variable NonExchUSList, which is 
measured as the number of foreign firms listing in the U.S. via a Level I (OTC listings) or Level 
IV ADRs (private placements) in the month of the listing event.  Because Level I and IV ADR 
listings are not subject to the provisions of the Act, the rate of foreign non-exchange listings will 
act as an instrument for omitted time-varying effects influencing foreign listing preferences 
independent of Sarbanes-Oxley (such as IFRS adoption, shifts in the credibility of U.S. markets, 
enhanced AIM marketing efforts, the Global Research Analyst Settlement, etc.).  Second, as 
discussed above, we use the variable Diff_DomesticList to control for changes in the 
attractiveness of a UK listing (and AIM in particular) over time.   
 The last set of explanatory variables measure firm-level incentives that influence the 
choice of a host country.  We consider six firm attributes: industry affiliation, size, profitability, 
growth opportunities, the use of a high quality auditor and whether or not the firm raised equity 
                                                 
25 For three of our exchange-level metrics, Diff_IndexReturns, Diff_P/E_Index and Diff_DomesticList, NYSE and 
NASDAQ attributes are benchmarked against the return, pricing and listing attributes of London’s Main Market and 
AIM, respectively.  These pairings are chosen since our descriptive statistics show that these pairs of exchanges are 
attracting roughly similar types of firms.   
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capital around the time of the new foreign listing.26  A firm may choose to list on an exchange 
that already hosts the firm’s competitors or peers or has a reputation for industry-specific 
investor expertise.  To capture these fixed industry-level preferences, we include an array of nine 
industry indicator variables.27  Industry affiliation is based on each firm’s Datastream industry 
classification.  For those 74 firms that are ‘unclassified’ on Datastream, classifications are based 
on descriptive information provided through the firm’s own website or Google Finance.  In terms 
of financial attributes, firm size is measured as the log of the total assets (in nominal U.S. 
dollars) in the year of the listing and profitability is measured as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items in the year of the cross-listing event, scaled by end of the year assets.  The 
firm’s market-to-book ratio is included to capture differences in expected growth opportunities 
(as well as correlated financial distress/risk attributes).   
The expected cost of listing on a U.S. exchange is larger if the firm has poor corporate 
governance.  Prior research finds that, in an international context, the use of a high quality 
auditor is positively related to the quality of corporate governance (Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 
2003; Wang, Wong and Xia, 2006).  We include the indicator variable Big5 to capture whether 
the firm employed a Big 5 auditor around the time of the listing.  Finally, prior research on the 
bonding hypothesis suggests that foreign listings are motivated by the need to raise equity capital 
either at home or on the host exchange at favorable rates.  We include two indicator variables, 
Issuance_Home and Issuance_Host, to capture whether the firm raised equity capital in their 
home or host market, respectively, in the one month period surrounding the foreign listing.   
In order to implement the model, we delete those events where the choice between a U.S. 
and a U.K. listing is either mechanical or confounded.  First, we eliminate contemporaneous 
listings in both the U.S. and London (13 cases of dual listing events and one instance of different 
                                                 
26 All results are robust to the inclusion of leverage in our estimations.  Leverage is measured as total liabilities over 
total assets at the end of the year.  
27 The following nine industries are each represented by a unique indicator variable in our tabulated analysis: Oil 
and Gas, Financial Institutions, Utilities, Forestry, Real Estate, Software and Technology, Pharmaceutical and 
Biotech, Telecom and Transportation.  All results are robust to the inclusion of a finer set of seventeen unique 
industry indicator variables; however, we report results based on our reduced-form model for parsimony.   
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classes of equity shares being issued simultaneously).28  Second, we eliminate those events 
where the foreign firm had a prior listing on the alternative exchange at the time of the sample 
cross-listing event (89 cases).  Third, we eliminated those firms that were domiciled in the U.S. 
and the U.K., because these firms do not face the same international exchange choice as non-US 
and non-UK firms.  Fourth, we delete those firms with insufficient financial data to estimate our 
models.  Lastly, we delete those firms that do not meet Nasdaq size and profitability listing 
requirements in the year of listing. These adjustments result in a final sample of 1,021 unique 
U.S. and U.K. foreign events between June 1995 and June 2006. 
 
5.2 Evidence on a change in U.S. versus U.K. listing preferences  
 Table 3 presents the results of our estimations of equation (2) using the complete sample 
of firm events.  These models are estimated with and without our domestic listing variable (due 
to the likely correlation between the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and domestic listing rates in 
the U.S.) and our non-exchange foreign listing variable (due to the potentially endogenous 
relation between a foreign firm’s exchange and non-exchange listing decision). 
 These estimations produce several key observations.  First, the explanatory power of each 
model (i.e., concordant percentage) is substantially higher than a naïve prediction model, 
suggesting that our firm-level, exchange-level and country-level explanatory variables are 
capable of capturing variation in cross-sectional incentives for a U.S. versus U.K. listing.  
Second, results (not tabulated) show that our geographic and industry variables explain 
significant cross-sectional variation in listing choice, with coefficients on eight of our nine 
industry indicator variables and all three of our regional geographic indicator variables being 
statistically significant. We also find that Canadian and Israeli (Irish) firms are statistically more 
likely to list on a U.S. (U.K.) exchanges.  Third, firms are more likely to choose a foreign 
exchange with stronger liquidity and higher market valuations.  Fourth, firms from countries 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, all of the dual listing events in our sample occurred prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
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with relatively weaker institutions (i.e., code law and emerging markets) are more likely to avoid 
a U.S. listing after controlling for other attributes.  Fifth, U.S. exchanges are more likely to 
attract larger firms and firms that raise equity in the host market, and are less likely to attract 
firms with weaker governance as reflected by their auditor choice.  Finally, both of our 
instruments for changes in the relative attractiveness of U.S. and U.K. exchanges, 
NonExchUSList and Diff_DomesticList, have significant positive relations with U.S. exchange 
listing choices, consistent with non-SOX related forces impacting listing decisions over this time 
period.  All of these relations are robust across both specifications. 
After controlling for these determinants of the U.S.-U.K. listing choice, we find that the 
average probability of a U.S. listing is significantly lower after the Act in both models.  In terms 
of economic significance, the negative fixed effect implies an approximate 16% decrease in the 
probability of the average firm listing on a U.S. exchange after the enactment of SOX, consistent 
with arguments that some foreign firms have begun bypassing U.S. exchanges in favor of the 
LSE in the post-Act period.  As expected, the inclusion of NonExchUSList and 
Diff_DomesticList as instruments for non-SOX forces influencing foreign firms’ preferences for 
a U.S. listing attenuates the negative relation between the likelihood of a U.S. listing and 
PostSOX, our post-Act time period indicator variable.  More importantly, these positive relations 
suggest that our instruments are successfully capturing time-varying listing preferences for a 
U.S. and U.K. exchange listing, respectively, independent of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Both a decrease in 
non-exchange U.S. listing activity and an increase in domestic U.K. listing activity are associated 
with a reduced likelihood of a U.S. listing; however, after controlling for these effects, the 
negative relation between PostSOX and the U.S. listing choice remains.29  
 
                                                 
29 To confirm that our inferences are not an artifact of a mis-specified logistic model, we also re-estimate these 
models using an OLS regression.  Although OLS estimations with a binary dependent variable are inefficient, they 
produce unbiased parameter estimates and are not sensitive to the underlying distributional assumptions of the 
logistic framework.  Coefficients from these estimations (not tabulated) support the inference that the likelihood of a 
foreign U.S. listing has decreased in the period following the enactment of SOX.  
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5.3 Exchange-level tests of a shift in listing preferences following Sarbanes-Oxley 
The preceding analysis suggests that the average likelihood of a U.S. vis-à-vis a U.K. 
exchange listing has declined in the period following SOX after controlling for other listing 
determinants.  Despite this average decline in our sample, the impact of SOX is not expected to 
impact exchanges or firms equally.  Evidence on domestic U.S. firms suggests that the costs of 
SOX disproportionately affect smaller firms (Kamar et al. 2007).  If this is true for foreign firms 
as well, the decline in listing behavior should be concentrated among small firms considering a 
Nasdaq listing versus a NYSE listing.  In contrast, the potential net benefits of the Act are likely 
to be greater for large firms raising equity capital or domiciled in countries with weak 
institutions.  To test for this variation, we examine the impact of SOX on the decision to list on 
the NYSE and Nasdaq separately.   
Our first analysis compares NYSE listings against two sets of U.K. listings: All NYSE-
eligible firms and all NYSE-eligible firms that listed on the LSE’s Main Market.  Coefficients 
from estimations of equation (2) for these two pairs of listing choices are presented in Table 4. 
Consistent with the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley being less onerous for large, NYSE-eligible firms, 
these estimations are unable to document a significant relation between the probability of a 
NYSE listing and our PostSOX indicator variable.  These results mirror the results and 
interpretation in Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) for their sample of similar sized firms.  Thus, 
for this set of firms, which account for a substantial portion of the sample’s market 
capitalization, we find that Sarbanes-Oxley had no impact to foreign listing preferences.  In 
terms of determinants, the greater sensitivity of the listing decision to the likelihood of raising 
capital and weak country level institutions in this sample suggests that a tradeoff between both 
the expected benefits (lower cost capital) and expected costs (indirect costs associated with 
greater investor and regulatory scrutiny) of the listing plays an important role among these firms.  
Our second exchange-level analysis compares Nasdaq listings against three sets of U.K. 
listings: All firms that met Nasdaq listing requirements in the year of listing, all Nasdaq-eligible 
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firms that listed on the LSE’s AIM and all Nasdaq-eligible firms that listed on the LSE’s Main 
Market.  Coefficients from estimations of equation (2) for these three pairs of listing choices are 
presented in Table 5.  Similar to our estimations for NYSE-eligible foreign firms, we are unable 
to document a significant negative relation between the likelihood of a Nasdaq listing and our 
PostSOX indicator variable for the full sample of Nasdaq-eligible firms.  The preceding analysis, 
however, groups together two types of U.K. listings: foreign firms that self-selected between the 
LSE’s Main Market and LSE’s AIM.  Given the different economic profiles of these two sets of 
firms, we re-estimate equation (2) after splitting the Nasdaq-eligible U.K. listings on the basis 
their actual U.K. exchange destination.  This partition generates two key findings.   
First, the likelihood of a Nasdaq listing versus an AIM listing is significantly lower in the 
post-Act period after controlling for other determinants of this listing choice.  This negative 
effect is consistent with the direct compliance costs of SOX deterring smaller foreign firms from 
listing onto U.S. exchanges and with the LSE’s attempt to capitalize on the perceived burden of 
current U.S. regulations to attract listings from small, growth-oriented firms to the AIM.  
Economically, this fixed effect implies that the likelihood of a U.S. listing fell by approximately 
28% following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley among these firms.  It is important to recognize 
that this analysis explicitly excludes AIM firms that do not qualify for a Nasdaq listing based on 
the exchange’s size and performance-related listing standards; as such, the documented effect 
pertains to AIM-listed firms that were eligible to list on the Nasdaq but did not. 
Second, the likelihood of a Nasdaq versus a Main Market listing is marginally higher in 
the post-SOX period.  Economically, this coefficient suggests that the likelihood of a U.S. listing 
increased by approximately one percent following SOX among these larger Main market firms.  
This increase in listing frequency, though small, contradicts the basic trends observed in Tables 2 
and 3 for U.S. listings and highlights the potential increase in benefits of a U.S. listing following 
SOX.  Given that firms listing on the LSE’s main exchange tend to be larger than firms listing on 
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AIM, this positive relation suggests that there exists a point at which the direct costs associated 
with the Act can be subsumed by the increased benefits of a Nasdaq listing under SOX.  
 
5.4 Impact of raising capital on listing preferences following Sarbanes-Oxley 
 The costs and benefits of a foreign listing are expected to vary by whether or not the firm 
intends to raise equity capital in the host market.  We examine whether preferences for a U.S. 
listing changed differentially depending up whether or not the firm raised capital on the host 
exchange in the one month period around the listing event.  Table 6 presents coefficients from 
separate estimations of equation (2) (excluding Host_Issuance) for these two samples; two 
interesting results emerge. 
   First, the determinants of listing preferences differ depending upon whether or not 
capital is being raised.  Although listing choices for both sets of firms are positively influenced 
by the firm’s size, auditor choice and inversely related to development of their home country, 
other forces are context specific.  Firms domiciled in countries with weak institutions are 
significantly less likely to list in the U.S. if they are not raising capital; in contrast, home country 
institutions have no significant impact if the firm is raising capital.  This difference is likely due 
to the fact that absent capital raising benefits, the net regulatory cost for firms from weak 
institutions to list in the U.S. is prohibitively high.  We also find that for those firms not raising 
capital, listing choices are significantly influenced by relative trade relationships, consistent with 
these firms listing choices instead being shaped by product market forces.  Second, after 
controlling for these different determinants, we document that the average decline in the 
likelihood of a U.S. listing in the post-SOX period exists among both sets of firms. 
 
5.5 Summary of conclusions from our exchange choice models 
The preceding estimations generate two main conclusions about the impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley on foreign listing behavior.  First, among large foreign firms choosing between a US 
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exchange and the LSE’s Main Market, listing preferences did not change following the Act.  
Thus, for a set of large, foreign firms likely seeking a U.S. listing for bonding purposes, we find 
that the attractive of U.S. markets has not changed (and may potentially have marginally 
increased) following the enactment of SOX.  This conclusion is confirmed by Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2007)’s analysis of US listing decisions around Sarbanes-Oxley for their global 
sample of similarly-sized foreign firms.   
Second, among small foreign firms eligible to choose between the Nasdaq and LSE’s 
AIM, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing has declined following the Act.  This decline 
exists after controlling for changes in the characteristics of firms seeking foreign listings, 
changes in relative exchange performance (prices, liquidity, returns) following the Act, changes 
in the attractiveness of U.S. markets absent the effect of SOX, and changes in the growth of the 
domestic AIM listings.  As mentioned earlier, related research by Doidge et al. (2007) does not 
conduct a Nasdaq – AIM comparison.  Our analysis the Nasdaq-AIM listing decision, through 
the incorporation of a hand-collected sample of smaller firms, represents a unique contribution of 
our study. 
 
6. Additional evidence on foreign listing decisions 
 This section provides additional evidence on foreign listing decisions around the 
enactment of SOX.  Section 6.1 provides evidence on the determinants of a U.S / U.K. listing in 
the period before and after the Act, while Section 6.2 uses a prediction model to identify the 
attributes of those firms that were predicted to list on a U.S. or U.K. exchange on the basis of 
pre-SOX determinants and to examine the attributes of those firms whose ultimate exchange 
choice does not map into our prediction.  By identifying the determinants that have changed and 
the attributes of those firms that appear to have bypassed their predicted exchange, the analysis 
sheds light on the costs and benefits of the new regulation. 
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6.1 Shift in the determinants of U.S. listings pre versus post Sarbanes-Oxley 
 To better understand how Sarbanes-Oxley has changed the preferences for a foreign 
listing on a U.S. exchange, we estimate equation (2), without the PostSOX variable, for the 
separate periods before and after the Act.  Similar to the analysis in Leuz, Triantis and Wang 
(2006) for SEC deregistration, a comparison of the coefficients under these two regulatory 
regimes highlights the incentives that are likely to have changed around this event.  Coefficients 
from these two estimations are presented in Table 7. 
 Several discernable changes in the underlying determinants of the U.S.-U.K. listing 
choice exist.  First, the probability of listing on a U.S. exchange is more strongly related to firm 
size following the Act.  The greater sensitivity of listing decisions to firm size is consistent with 
the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley being more onerous for smaller firms. Similar evidence was found 
in Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2006) for domestic deregistration activity.  Second, firms from code 
law countries are marginally more likely to seek a U.S. listing following the Act, consistent with 
firms from countries with weak investor protections experiencing the greatest relative increase in 
U.S. listing benefits under the Act.  Third, firms from the E.U. are significantly less likely to list 
in the U.S. following the Act, consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption requirements reducing 
the incremental costs of a U.K. listing during the post-Act period.  This change highlights the 
influence of non-Sarbanes-Oxley related forces on listing preferences during the post-Act time 
period.  Finally, the relations between listing preferences, product market interaction and the rate 
of domestic listing activity are substantially weaker in the post-Act timeframe.   
 
6.2 Characteristics of firms that bypassed U.S. and U.K. exchanges following the Act 
 We further examine which foreign firms have been deterred from listing on a U.S. 
exchange by using coefficients from our fitted pre-Act model to predict the expected exchange 
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choice for those foreign firms that subsequently list on either a U.S. or U.K. exchange after July 
2002.30  This evidence is presented in Table 8. 
 The first panel of Table 8 highlights the predicted level of foreign listing activity in the 
post-Act period.  These statistics shows that the aggregate decline in U.S. listing activity can be 
attributed to both SOX and non-SOX factors.  First, after taking into consideration the firm’s 
exchange choice preferences based on historical determinants, the percent of firms likely to 
prefer U.S. exchanges is expected to decline in the period following Sarbanes-Oxley.  In other 
words, among those foreign firms that ultimately list on either a U.S. or U.K. exchange, a greater 
percentage are expected to self-select a U.K. listing based on their innate characteristics 
regardless of the change in the U.S. regulatory environment.  Specifically, the proportion of U.S. 
to U.K. listings after July 2002 is predicted to be 17.6% lower than the pre-Act levels simply 
given the economic profile of the listing companies and differences in exchange-level 
characteristics during the post-Act period. 
 Second, we continue to find both a significantly lower listing rate and a smaller 
percentage of foreign firms selecting U.S. exchanges post-SOX after controlling for the non-
SOX-related decline in foreign listing activity.  The proportion of foreign firms choosing a U.S 
exchange over a U.K. exchange is nearly 22.1% lower than expected; this decline in U.S. listing 
activity is both economically and statistically significant.  Moreover, we find that among the 
firms that appear to have bypassed U.S. exchanges, 80.2% of these companies listed on the 
LSE’s AIM, consistent with the exchange-level evidence presented in Table 5. 
To assess whether this portion of the decline in listing frequency can be attributed to 
SOX, we examine the characteristics of listing firms conditional on whether or not they actually 
listed on the exchange predicted by our baseline model.  Descriptive evidence for firms predicted 
to list on U.S. and U.K. exchanges is presented in Panels B and C, respectively.  This approach 
                                                 
30 These predictions are based on the pre-SOX model estimated in Table 7 using all available observations.  We 
were unable to utilize the finer, exchange-level choice models of Table 5 in this section due to a limited number of 
AIM observations with sufficient accounting and stock price data to estimate those models during the pre-SOX 
period. 
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produces three key findings.  First, focusing on firms predicted to list onto a U.S. exchange, we 
identify a set of firms that appear to have bypassed U.S. exchanges in favor of a U.K. listing 
following the Act.  As expected, these firms are smaller and less profitable than the firms that 
actually listed on U.S. exchanges, have a lower frequency of using a high quality auditor and are 
disproportionably from developed countries.  Smaller and less profitable firms, along with firms 
using a low quality auditor, are likely to find the Act’s costs more onerous, while those firms 
from developed countries likely garner the smallest benefit from a U.S. listing.  In aggregate, 
these firms account for approximately $36.5 billion in market capitalization.  These patterns are 
consistent with SOX screening out firms from the left tail of the distribution of likely U.S. listing 
candidates along the dimensions of firm performance and size.  Whether or not this result can be 
interpreted as the Act successfully screening out marginal foreign firms hinges on whether or not 
the quality of the listing firms (and their governance practices) are increasing in either or both of 
these attributes.31    
Second, we split these U.K. listings on the basis of their ultimate exchange platform.  
Consistent with its less restrictive listing requirements, AIM attracted smaller, less profitable 
firms, with a majority of the firms employing a low quality auditor and domiciled in common 
law, developed economies.  In contrast, the Main Market attracted primarily large, profitable 
firms domiciled in countries with weak investor protections and low economic development.  
Third, focusing on firms predicted to list on U.K. exchanges, our methodology identifies 
a small set of firms that listed on U.S. exchanges following the Act that were predicted to list on 
the LSE based on their firm-specific, industry and home country attributes.  These firms are 
larger and more profitable than the average U.K. listing and account for approximately $24.6 
billion in additional market capitalization.  Moreover, nearly all of these firms are from emerging 
                                                 
31 For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find that small firms, firms with a higher frequency of losses, and 
firms with a higher probability of financial distress are more likely to have reported an internal control deficiency 
prior to SOX. 
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economies, consistent with large, high quality firms from countries with weak institutions 
capturing the enhanced bonding/reputation benefits of a U.S. listing after the enactment of SOX.   
 
7. Interpretation of the results 
 In this paper, we find two main results with respect to the impact of SOX on foreign 
listing decisions.  First, among large foreign firms choosing between NYSE and the LSE Main 
Market, SOX did not influence listing preferences and find a marginal increase in the likelihood 
of a U.S. listing among firms choosing between the NASDAQ and the LSE’s Main Market.  
Second, among a set of small foreign firms choosing between the NASDAQ and LSE’s AIM, the 
likelihood of a U.S. listings has declined following the Act.  These results, particularly with 
respect to the documented impact of SOX among NASDAQ-AIM firms, are subject to some 
potential concerns.  These issues are discussed below. 
 
7.1 Change the characteristics of listing firms over time 
 One potential concern is that the characteristics of firms seeking a foreign listing have 
changed over time.  Given that firms are drawn to specific exchanges on the basis of their 
geographic, industry and firm-level characteristics, our tests and results could be confounded by 
a fundamental change in the type of firms seeking a foreign listing before and after SOX.  To 
control for these self-selection effects, our exchange choice model explicitly captures the impact 
of firm characteristics on the foreign listing decisions.  These variables are highly significant in 
most of our models, allowing the predicted likelihood of a U.S. or U.K. listing to change as the 
underlying characteristics of listing firms change.  As a result, our exchange choice models 
actually predict that the frequency of U.S. listings was expected to decline following the Act 
simply due to a change in the composition of the firms seeking a U.S. or U.K. listing during this 
time period.  More importantly, after explicitly controlling for these changing attributes, the 
actual U.S. listing frequency is still lower than expected in the post-SOX period. 
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7.2 Growth in AIM as a listing venue 
We document a decreased likelihood of a U.S. exchange listing among those firms 
choosing between a NASDAQ and AIM listing in the time period following SOX.  One 
interpretation of this result is that the observed decrease is due to a change in the relative 
attractiveness of AIM as a listing venue rather than the impact of the new regulation. 
To alleviate this concern, we explicitly include the variable Diff_DomesticListt in our 
exchange choice models.  Measured as the difference in the number of new domestic firms 
listing on a specific U.S. and U.K. exchange (DomesticListt) in the month of the foreign listing, 
Diff_DomesticListt is expected to act as an instrument for omitted exchange-level factors and 
events that influence the relative attractiveness of one exchange over another.  Effectively, we 
are using domestic listing rates as our proxy for the exchange’s attractiveness as a listing venue; 
this proxy is consistent with the anecdotal evidence in Pagano et al. (2002) that foreign firms are 
attracted to exchanges experiencing a strong, contemporaneous growth in new domestic listings.   
As expected, we find a significant positive relation between Diff_DomesticList and the 
likelihood of U.S. listing; this relation indicates that as growth in domestic NASDAQ listings 
outpaces (lags) growth in domestic AIM listings, the likelihood of a U.S. listing increases 
(decreases).  After controlling for time-series variation in these domestic listing rates, the 
decreased likelihood of a NASDAQ listing versus the AIM alternative remains during the post-
SOX period. 
 
7.3 Are the firms that list on AIM candidates for a Nasdaq listing?  
We have addressed this potential concern in two ways. First, recall that all firms that we 
include in the Nasddaq-AIM comparison are only those AIM firms that we identify as being 
eligible for a Nasdaq listing.  We conduct a comprehensive hand collection of data and find that 
only 159 out of the 303 firms that listed on AIM are Nasdaq eligible. Therefore we only include 
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these 159 firms as our comparison sample.32  Second, the identification of firms that bypassed 
the U.S. and went to AIM in the post-SOX period is based on a pre-SOX exchange choice 
prediction model. This model includes size, profitability and book to market among other 
variables that may predict if a firm will list in the U.S. or the U.K. We apply this model to a pre-
SOX data and use that to predict post-SOX outcomes. Hence any firm that is identified as 
bypassing the U.S. is deviating from this pre-SOX model meaning that these AIM bound firms 
were predicted as U.S. candidates based on similarity with the characteristics of firms that listed 
in the U.S. pre-SOX.  Hence, while it may be true that many AIM firms are not Nasdaq 
candidates, the firms that our model identifies as bypassing the U.S. had the characteristics that 
U.S. bound firms possessed in the pre-SOX time period 
 
7.4 Change in the attractiveness of the U.S. as a listing venue 
 The observed decline in listing frequency among these smaller firms could also be the 
result of a decreased attractiveness of a U.S. listing venue for reasons unrelated to SOX.  To 
control for the attractiveness of U.S. exchanges absent the effect of the Act, we include the 
variable NonExchUSList, which is measured as the number of foreign firms listing in the U.S. via 
a Level I or Level IV ADR in the month of the listing decision.  Because these listings are not 
subject to the provisions of the Act, changes in the rate of these foreign listings will act as an 
instrument for omitted time-varying effects influencing foreign listing decisions.  As expected, 
we document a significant positive relation between NonExchUSList and the likelihood of U.S. 
listing; this relation indicates that as foreign firms’ preferences towards a non-exchange US 
listing change (i.e., absent the effect of SOX), the likelihood of a U.S. exchange listing changes 
in the same direction.  After controlling for time-series variation in these foreign listing 
                                                 
32 DKS (2007) find data for only 80 of the 258 AIM firms in their sample confirming our concerns that Worldscope 
does not cover this sample of firms adequately. They find 21 of those 80 firms are eligible to list in Nasdaq. Using 
more detailed hand collected data we find that 159 out of the 303 AIM firms in our sample are Nasdaq eligible. 
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preferences, the decreased likelihood of a NASDAQ listing versus the AIM alternative remains 
during the post-SOX period. 
 
7.5 Is the documented effect due to Sarbanes-Oxley? 
 We document a decreased likelihood of a U.S. exchange listing among those firms 
choosing between a NASDAQ and AIM listing in the time period following the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  In these types of event studies, causality is difficult to infer. However, we 
believe the evidence is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley having an impact on this particular set of 
foreign listing decisions.  First, we explicitly control for other time period specific events that 
change the likelihood of a U.S. or U.K. exchange listing (as discussed above).  These control 
variables have significant explanatory power in most of our models.   
Second, we find that the determinants of foreign listing decisions have changed in a 
manner consistent with the expected incremental costs and benefits of SOX.  These effects 
mirror the conclusions documented in research on deregistration decisions following the 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley (See Leuz, Triantis and Wang, 2006). Third, we find that the 
characteristics of the new firms repelled from and attracted to U.S. exchanges following SOX are 
consistent with the types of firms that are likely to incur the greatest cost and derive the greatest 
benefits respectively under the Act.  Finally, the effect only exists among small firms.  We are 
unable to document an adverse effect of Sarbanes-Oxley among other subsets of listing firms, 
suggesting that our models are not being confounded by a systematic, omitted cross-sectional 
shock.  Instead, the effect is concentrated among those firms where the costs of SOX are 
expected, ex ante, to be the most onerous.  Although causality is not possible to determine in this 
setting, all of our results are consistent with the Act having an impact among small, marginal 
firms.  Our tests, similar to Doidge et al. (2007), are able to reject the hypothesis that Sarbanes-
Oxley had an adverse impact on foreign listing activity among large foreign firms; failure to find 
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this result amongst the smallest, U.S. exchange-eligible foreign firms would have cast 
considerable doubt on this hypothesis in general.   
 
7.6 Economic significance of the impact of SOX. 
Our NASDAQ-AIM tests search for the effect of the Act in the setting where the adverse 
consequences of the Act are expected to be the most material.  Our results confirm that 
expectation - we document the adverse impact of Sarbanes-Oxley among those firms that ex ante 
face the greatest costs of the Act.  In contrast, among large firms eligible for a NYSE listing, we 
find that Sarbanes-Oxley has no effect.  Given that the incremental costs of Sarbanes-Oxley are, 
ex ante, less material for these larger firms and are unlikely to subsume the expected benefits of 
bonding to the U.S. regime, this lack of effect is to be expected.   
 Our analyses show that the total market capitalization of foreign firms affected by the Act 
is significantly smaller than the market capitalization of those firms that are not materially 
affected by the Act.  This finding challenges conventional wisdom that SOX adversely affects 
the competitiveness of U.S. exchanges; instead, the impact of the Act varies by firm type.  In 
order to fully understand the costs and benefits of regulation, it is useful to know which sets of 
firms are and are not impacted by the regulation; our paper provides such balanced evidence.  
Ultimately, whether the loss of ninety small firms with an aggregate market capitalization of $35 
billion is economically significant to U.S. exchanges or the U.S. economy is purely subjective in 
nature, and the long-run economic impact from the continual loss of such small firms is an open 
question.33 
  
8. Conclusions 
                                                 
33 Various commentators (for example see the report of Committee on Capital Markets Regulation) identify the 
higher regulatory cost to small firms as a significant concern for a few reasons. Venture capital investors are 
adversely affected by a loss of liquidity due to reduced exit opportunities. Moreover around 40% of employment in 
publicly traded companies is in firms once funded by VC investors. Higher regulatory costs drive smaller firms to 
non-exchange venues (such as the OTC market) with weaker disclosure requirements making it harder for smaller 
investors to invest in such companies.  
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In this paper, we examine the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by 
examining foreign listing behavior on U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the 
enactment of the Act.  We use a sample of all listing events on U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 
1995-2006, and document that the rate of foreign listings onto U.S. exchanges relative to the 
U.K. benchmark has declined in the post-Act period.  To examine if listing preferences have 
changed over time, we examine if the London Stock Exchange is attracting foreign firms in the 
post-Act time period that would otherwise have listed on a U.S. exchange prior to the Act.   
Our analysis examines the effect of SOX after taking into account changes over time in 
the types of foreign firms seeking exchange listings, decline in the importance of U.S. exchanges 
as a listing platform, the growth of the LSE’s AIM as an attractive listing option, and other 
contemporaneous events that may have altered foreign firms preferences for a U.S. exchange 
listing, including (but not limited to) scandals such as Enron, the Global Analyst Settlement and 
the E.U.’s mandated adoption of IFRS. 
Our first result challenges the conventional wisdom that SOX adversely affected 
competitiveness of U.S. exchanges. Among larger firms eligible for a NYSE and Nasdaq listing 
and choosing between the U.S. exchanges and a London Stock Exchange Main Market listing, 
we find that SOX has no effect.  This lack of effect is expected because the direct costs of the 
Act are relatively smaller for larger firms and bonding related benefits are expected to be greater 
for such firms, especially for those firms domiciled in countries with weaker institutions.  We 
also find that nearly half of the post-Act decline in U.S. listings (relative to U.K. listings) can be 
explained by the changing attributes of foreign firms seeking listings.  Thus, pre-SOX self-
selection tendencies alone, when combined with the types of firms seeking foreign listing, would 
have predicted a material decline in U.S. listings during the post-SOX period.  
However, our second result confirms the concerns of the critics of the Act. After 
controlling for self-selection tendencies, we find that among smaller foreign firms choosing 
between the NASDAQ and LSE’s AIM, the average probability of a firm listing its shares on a 
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U.S. exchange (versus a U.K. exchange) is significantly lower in the post Act period.  In other 
words, the adverse impact of SOX is concentrated among those smaller firms that ex ante face 
the greatest costs of the Act. This is the first evidence (of which we are aware) that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has altered the flow of foreign listings across international exchanges. 
Lastly, our prediction model suggests that the set of firms most likely to have bypassed 
U.S. exchanges in favor of a U.K. listing following SOX are mainly composed of AIM-listed 
firms that are smaller, less profitable and more likely to use a lower quality auditor than foreign 
firms that actually listed on U.S. exchanges.  Our prediction model also identifies a small set of 
large, profitable firms mainly from emerging markets that choose to list on U.S. exchanges 
following the enactment of SOX despite being predicted to list in the U.K., consistent with 
greater expected benefits from a U.S. listing for these firms. 
Together, these characteristics coincide with the types of foreign firms that are unable 
(able) to absorb the Act’s incremental costs or garner the smallest (largest) benefit from a U.S. 
listing bypassing (being drawn towards) a U.S. listing.   The evidence is consistent with a change 
in both the expected costs and benefits of a U.S. listing following the enactment of SOX.  The 
better separation in the type of firms listing on U.S. and U.K. exchanges is consistent with higher 
governance costs increasing the bonding related benefits of a U.S. listing. 
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Appendix 1 
Distribution of foreign listing events (June 1995 – June 2006) 
 
 
 U.S. Exchanges  U.K. Exchanges  Total 
 
 NASDAQ NYSE Total  AIM Main Total   
          
Netherlands Antilles 1 0 1  0 0 0  1 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Argentina 5 7 12  0 0 0  12 
Australia 19 6 25  55 1 56  81 
Austria 0 3 3  0 0 0  3 
Belgium 3 2 5  1 0 1  6 
Bangladesh 0 0 0  1 0 1  1 
Bahrain 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Bahamas 1 1 2  0 0 0  2 
Belize 0 0 0  7 0 7  7 
Bermuda 33 30 63  27 9 36  99 
Brazil 3 34 37  0 0 0  37 
Barbados 0 0 0  1 0 1  1 
British Virgin Islands 8 0 8  18 0 18  26 
Canada 137 96 233  45 6 51  284 
Switzerland 3 14 17  0 4 4  21 
Chile 0 11 11  0 1 1  12 
China 2 17 19  0 6 6  25 
Colombia 0 1 1  0 0 0  1 
Cayman Islands 32 6 38  16 4 20  58 
Cyprus 0 1 1  4 1 5  6 
Czech Republic 0 0 0  0 3 3  3 
Germany 13 17 30  3 2 5  35 
Denmark 2 0 2  1 0 1  3 
Dominican Republic 0 1 1  0 0 0  1 
Egypt 0 0 0  0 10 10  10 
Spain 4 1 5  0 2 2  7 
Estonia 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Finland 2 4 6  0 1 1  7 
France 17 19 36  1 3 4  40 
Falkland Islands 0 0 0  2 0 2  2 
United Kingdom 61 46 107  0 0 0  107 
Ghana 0 1 1  0 0 0  1 
Greece 3 6 9  0 10 10  19 
Gibraltar 0 0 0  1 2 3  3 
Guernsey 0 1 1  0 0 0  1 
Hong Kong 19 7 26  1 0 1  27 
Croatia 0 0 0  0 2 2  2 
Hungary 0 1 1  0 4 4  5 
Indonesia 1 3 4  0 2 2  6 
India 2 11 13  2 20 22  35 
Ireland 11 4 15  42 23 65  80 
Iceland 1 0 1  0 0 0  1 
Israel 81 4 85  18 11 29  114 
Italy 3 5 8  4 0 4  12 
Jordan 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Japan 5 9 14  0 9 9  23 
Jersey 2 0 2  0 0 0  2 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
Distribution of foreign listing events (June 1995 – June 2006) 
 
 
 U.S. Exchanges  U.K. Exchanges  Total 
 
 NASDAQ NYSE Total  AIM Main Total   
          
Kazakhstan 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
South Korea 8 6 14  0 10 10  24 
Lebanon 0 0 0  0 2 2  2 
Lithuania 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Luxembourg 7 3 10  5 2 7  17 
Morocco 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Mexico 3 12 15  0 0 0  15 
Marshall Islands 9 0 9  0 1 1  10 
Malta 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Malawi 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Malaysia 0 0 0  1 0 1  1 
Netherlands 14 14 28  6 7 13  41 
Norway 2 5 7  1 1 2  9 
New Zealand 4 1 5  1 0 1  6 
Oman 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Panama 0 2 2  0 0 0  2 
Peru 0 3 3  0 0 0  3 
Philippines 1 0 1  0 1 1  2 
Papua New Guinea 1 0 1  0 0 0  1 
Poland 1 0 1  0 11 11  12 
Puerto Rico 0 5 5  0 0 0  5 
Portugal 0 3 3  0 0 0  3 
Qatar 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Romania 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Russia 1 6 7  0 9 9  16 
Singapore 6 3 9  1 0 1  10 
Sweden 11 2 13  2 0 2  15 
Tunisia 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
Turkey 0 1 1  0 9 9  10 
Taiwan 4 5 9  0 10 10  19 
United States 0 0 0  43 10 53  53 
Venezuela 0 2 2  0 0 0  2 
South Africa 6 6 12  0 1 1  13 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 
          
Total 536 440 976  310 217 527  1,503 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 1,503 foreign listing on U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges between 
June 1995 and June 2006.  Panel A presents various firm-level financial characteristics and three exchange-level relative 
performance measures.  MVE, Assets and Sales are the firm’s market value of equity, total assets, and total revenue in the 
year of the listing (in U.S. dollars).  ROA is defined as net income in the year of the listing, scaled by Assets.  BTM is the 
firm’s book-to-market ratio in the year of the listing, defined as the ratio of total shareholders’ equity to MVE.  If 
shareholders’ equity is negative, BTM is defined to be zero.  Big5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
employed a high quality Big 5 auditor around the listing event.  Issuance_Home and Issuance_Host are indicator variables 
equal to one if the firm raised equity capital in the home or host country in the month around the listing event, 
respectively.  Diff_Trade is the difference in the value of imports plus exports between the home country and the US and 
UK respectively, scaled by home country GDP, in the year of the foreign listing. CommonLaw, CodeLaw and Socialist are 
indicator variables equal to one if the firm’s home country has a common law, code law or socialist legal tradition.  EU is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country that belongs to the European Union at the time of 
the listing.  Diff_Liquidity is the difference is share turnover between a given U.S. exchange and the London Stock 
Exchange in the month of the listing.  Diff_IndexReturn is the difference in index returns between a given U.S. exchange 
and the corresponding U.K. exchange for the twelve calendar months preceding the listing event. For the two U.S. 
exchanges, IndexReturn is measured using the return to the NASDAQ and NYSE composite index, respectively.  For the 
two U.K. markets, IndexReturn is measured using the return to the FTSE-350 index for the LSE Main Market and the 
FTSE AIM-All share index for the AIM.  Diff_P/E_Index is differences in the aggregate price-earnings multiple between a 
given U.S. exchange and the corresponding U.K. exchange in the month of listing. Diff_DomesticList is the difference in 
the number of new domestic listings between a given U.S. exchange and the respective U.K. exchange in the month of 
listing.  For all three exchange-level metrics, listings on London’s Main Market and AIM are benchmarked against the 
return, pricing and listing attributes of the NYSE and NASDAQ attributes, respectively.  NonExchUSList is the number of 
foreign firms that issued Level I and IV ADRs in the month of the listing. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics in the year of foreign listing 
 
 All Firms  Total U.S. NASDAQ NYSE  Total U.K. AIM Main 
          
MVEt        Mean 3,348.91  3,585.79 1,034.61 6,512.10  2,733.78 87.188 6,694.28 
                 Median 219.27  367.84 85.703 1,579.95  76.39 26.08 818.25 
          
Assetst      Mean 10,997.3  10,504.4 1,528.16 21,028.3  12,037.53 76.583 29,844.9 
                 Median 248.53  465.06 103.54 2,975.70  51.52 19.53 1,020.27 
          
Salest        Mean 2,433.33  2,636.51 355.550 5,311.64  1,987.77 41.838 4,716.43 
                 Median 118.99  203.14 45.07 1,367.05  21.57 2.68 477.34 
          
ROAt        Mean -0.039  -0.027 -0.097 0.055  -0.065 -0.144 0.052 
                 Median 0.024  0.030 0.006 0.044  0.008 -0.065 0.049 
          
BTMt        Mean 0.565  0.571 0.510 0.642  0.547 0.545 0.552 
                 Median 0.404  0.401 0.340 0.485  0.407 0.390 0.436 
          
Big5 0.817  0.912 0.885 0.945  0.641 0.536 0.790 
          
Issuance_Home 0.081  0.078 0.056 0.105  0.085 0.055 0.129 
          
Issuance_Host 0.331  0.325 0.384 0.252  0.342 0.403 0.253 
          
Diff_Trade 0.256  0.241 0.192 0.300  0.287 0.375 0.161 
          
CommonLaw 0.664  0.653 0.774 0.505  0.685 0.890 0.392 
          
CodeLaw 0.292  0.320 0.218 0.443  0.241 0.110 0.429 
          
Socialist 0.044  0.028 0.007 0.052  0.074 0.000 0.180 
          
EU 0.258  0.277 0.271 0.284  0.224 0.223 0.226 
          
Emerging 0.425  0.402 0.386 0.420  0.469 0.316 0.687 
          
Diff_Liquidity 2.599  2.817 4.219 1.110  2.081 2.762 1.108 
          
Diff_IndexReturns 0.022  0.036 0.028 0.046  -0.005 -0.032 0.033 
          
Diff_P/E_Index 0.479  0.556 0.857 0.188  0.337 0.466 0.153 
          
Diff_ DomesticList 0.278  0.542 1.051 -0.077  -0.210 -0.242 -0.164 
          
NonExchUSList 7.465  8.082 8.354 7.752  6.321 5.229 7.880 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel B: Industry classifications (percent of total sample) 
 
 All  Total    Total   
 Firms  U.S. NASDAQ NYSE  London AIM Main 
          
Industrials/Manufacturing 4.63  4.20 4.35 4.02  5.43 3.55 8.04 
Oil, Gas and Chemicals 9.52  8.30 3.44 14.29  11.80 13.87 8.93 
Financial Institutions 13.10  10.80 4.35 18.75  17.42 11.94 25.00 
Utilities 1.96  2.20 0.36 4.46  1.50 0.32 3.13 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 3.00  3.00 1.45 4.91  3.00 2.26 4.02 
Forestry, Mining and Metals 10.56  7.60 5.62 10.04  16.10 24.84 4.02 
Construction 1.83  1.30 1.09 1.56  2.81 2.26 3.57 
Real Estate 1.43  0.70 0.54 0.89  2.81 3.87 1.34 
Software and Technology 16.43  20.20 32.79 4.69  9.36 9.35 9.38 
Services 3.52  3.60 4.71 2.23  3.37 4.52 1.79 
Retail 1.89  1.90 1.63 2.23  1.87 0.32 4.02 
Electronics 3.26  3.30 4.17 2.23  3.18 4.52 1.34 
Healthcare 2.09  2.30 2.90 1.56  1.69 2.58 0.45 
Consumer Products 2.74  3.60 4.71 2.23  1.12 0.00 2.68 
Media 3.72  3.80 4.71 2.68  3.56 4.19 2.68 
Pharmaceutical / Biotech 5.02  5.50 7.97 2.46  4.12 5.16 2.68 
Mobile Telecommunication 3.00  3.80 3.08 4.69  1.50 0.00 3.57 
Fixed-line Telecommunication 5.74  6.70 5.43 8.26  3.93 1.61 7.14 
Transportation 3.19  4.20 4.35 4.02  1.31 0.65 2.23 
Leisure and Travel 3.39  3.00 2.36 3.79  4.12 4.19 4.02 
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Table 2 
Distribution of foreign listing activity before and after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
This table documents the frequency of foreign listing activity on U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges over the period 
June 1995 to June 2006.  The table also provides listing frequency data for the sub-periods before (pre-May 2002), 
during (May 2002 through July 2002) and after (post-July 2002) the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
Differences in the average number of firms listing on a given exchange per month (average NList) before and after 
the adoption of the Act are tested using a two-tailed t-test of means.   The column Percent U.S presents the ratio of 
total U.S. listings to total London listings over a specific time period.  The difference in the proportion of U.S. to 
London listings before and after the adoption of the Act is tested using a binomial test of means.   
 
   U.S. Exchanges  U.K. Exchanges   
 
 Total  NASDAQ NYSE Total  AIM Main Total  Percent U.S. 
            
6/95 – 6/06 1,503  536 440 976  310 217 527  0.6494 
            
Post-May 1995 82  37 28 65  2 15 17  0.7927 
1996 200  92 65 157  12 31 43  0.7850 
1997 166  75 64 139  5 22 27  0.8373 
1998 132  51 43 94  6 32 38  0.7121 
1999 120  60 30 90  5 25 30  0.7500 
2000 207  107 60 167  10 30 40  0.8068 
2001 94  20 51 71  13 10 23  0.7553 
2002 65  10 36 46  13 6 19  0.7077 
2003 44  9 17 25  13 6 19  0.5682 
2004 108  23 17 40  58 10 68  0.3704 
2005 190  40 17 57  112 21 133  0.3000 
Pre-July 2006 95  13 12 25  61 9 70  0.2632 
            
            
Total number of listings conditional on the timing of Sarbanes-Oxley: 
            
Pre-SOX 1,018  445 352 797  54 167 221  0.7829 
Transition 21  1 13 14  7 0 7  0.5833 
Post-SOX 464  90 75 165  249 50 299  0.3579 
            
            
Average number of firms listing per month (average Nlist): 
            
Entire Period 11.30  4.03 3.31 7.34  2.33 1.63 3.96  0.6494 
            
Pre-SOX 12.27  5.36 4.24 9.60  0.65 2.01 2.66  0.7829 
Post-SOX 9.87  1.91 1.60 3.51  5.30 1.06 6.36  0.3579 
            
Difference -2.40  -3.45 -2.64 -6.09  4.65 -0.95 3.70  -0.4250 
(t-statistic) (-1.91)  (-7.31) (-7.05) (-9.18)  (6.15) (-3.81) (4.37)  (-15.89) 
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Table 3 
Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the probability of a U.S. versus U.K. foreign listing 
 
This table presents select coefficients from various estimations of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU + β5Emerging  
+ β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_IndexReturns + β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList  
 
+ β12log(NonExchUSList) + β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Issuance_Host + β16Diff_Trade 
 
+ β17log(Assets) + β18ROA + β19log(1+BTM) + β20PostSOX + ε 
 
The sample consists of 1,021 unique U.S. and U.K. foreign listings between June 1995 and June 2006.  The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the foreign firm listed onto either the NASDAQ or the 
NYSE; zero if the foreign firm listed onto either the London Stock Exchanges’ Main Market or AIM. The indicator 
variables Canada, Ireland and Israel are equal to one if the firm is domiciled in Canada, Ireland or Israel, 
respectively.  The array Geography is a set of three indicator variables that captures the firm’s domicile in three 
broad geographic regions: Asia, Latin / South America and the Caribbean. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
   
Baseline 
 Controls for Domestic Listing 
Rates and Level I and IV ADRs 
     
Canada  1.524a  1.356a 
     
Ireland  -3.713a  -3.745a 
     
Israel  1.857a  1.716a 
     
EU  0.801c  0.534 
     
Emerging  -1.516a  -1.715a 
     
CodeLaw  -1.109a  -1.159a 
     
Socialist  -0.490  -0.640 
     
Diff_Liquidity  0.344a  0.248c 
     
Diff_IndexReturns  1.038c  -0.319 
     
Diff_P/E_Index  0.585  0.319 
     
Diff_DomesticList  -  0.892a 
     
NonExchUSList  -  0.471b 
     
Big5  1.483a  1.596a 
     
Issuance_Home  -0.442  -0.228 
     
Issuance_Host  0.764a  0.750a 
     
Diff_Trade  0.143  0.167c 
     
Log(Assets)  0.404a  0.423a 
     
ROA  0.292  0.299 
     
Log(1+BTM)  -0.095  -0.031 
     
PostSOX  -1.959a  -1.312a 
     
Industry and Geography Indicators  Included  Included 
     
Chi-squared: Log Likelihood Ratio  531.2a  577.9a 
Percent Concordant  91.1%  92.5% 
Number of observations  1,021  1,021 
(U.S. / London)  (758 / 263)  (758 / 263) 
     
a,b,c The estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the probability of a foreign listing on the NYSE 
 
This table presents select coefficients from various logistic estimations of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU + β5Emerging  
+ β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_IndexReturns + β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList  
 
+ β12log(NonExchUSList) + β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Issuance_Host + β16Diff_Trade 
 
+ β17log(Assets) + β18ROA + β19log(1+BTM) + β20PostSOX + ε 
 
The sample consists of all NYSE and U.K. foreign listings between June 1995 and June 2006 where the foreign firm 
met NYSE listing requirements in the year of listing.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the foreign firm listed onto the NYSE; zero if the foreign firm listed onto either the LSE’s Main Market or AIM.  
The first estimation includes all foreign firms that met NYSE listing requirements, regardless of UK exchange 
choice; the second estimation restricts the UK sample to the LSE Main Market.  The indicator variables Canada, 
Ireland and Israel (coefficients not presented) are equal to one if the firm is domiciled in Canada, Ireland or Israel, 
respectively.   The array Geography is a set of three indicator variables that captures the firm’s domicile in three 
broad geographic regions: Asia, Latin / South America and the Caribbean. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 NYSE vs. 
All NYSE-Eligible UK Listings 
 NYSE vs.  
LSE Main Market 
 
    
EU 0.088  0.364 
    
Emerging -2.996a  -2.975a 
    
CodeLaw -1.515a  -1.439b 
    
Socialist -0.256  -0.220 
    
Diff_Liquidity -1.242  0.426 
    
Diff_IndexReturns 3.019  3.816 
    
Diff_P/E_Index -2.028c  -0.001 
    
Diff_DomesticList 0.528b  0.284 
    
NonExchUSList -0.740  -0.444 
    
Big5 0.979c  0.990c 
    
Issuance_Home 0.534  0.465 
    
Issuance_Host 1.233a  1.170a 
    
Diff_Trade -0.218  -0.418 
    
Log(Assets) 0.152  0.125 
    
ROA 0.854  1.102 
    
Log(1+BTM) 0.613  0.666 
    
PostSOX -1.246  -0.625 
    
Industry / Geography Indicators Included  Included 
    
Chi-squared: Log Likelihood Ratio 193.8a  181.4a 
Percent Concordant 91.1%  91.1% 
Number of observations 426  416 
(U.S. / London) (333 / 93)  (333 / 83) 
    
a,b,c The estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the probability of a foreign listing on the Nasdaq 
 
This table presents select coefficients from various logistic estimations of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU + β5Emerging  
+ β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_IndexReturns + β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList  
 
+ β12log(NonExchUSList) + β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Issuance_Host + β16Diff_Trade 
 
+ β17log(Assets) + β18ROA + β19log(1+BTM) + β20PostSOX + ε 
 
The sample consists of all Nasdaq and U.K. foreign listings between June 1995 and June 2006 where the foreign 
firm meet Nasdaq listing requirements in the year of listing.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the foreign firm listed onto either the NASDAQ or the NYSE; zero if the foreign firm listed onto either the 
LSE’s Main Market or AIM.  The first estimation includes all foreign firms that met Nasdaq listing requirements, 
regardless of UK exchange choice; the second estimation restricts the UK sample to the LSE Alternative Investment 
Market; the third estimation restricts the UK sample to the LSE Main Market.  The indicator variables Canada, 
Ireland and Israel (coefficients not presented) are equal to one if the firm is domiciled in Canada, Ireland or Israel, 
respectively.   The array Geography is a set of three indicator variables that captures the firm’s domicile in three 
broad geographic regions: Asia, Latin / South America and the Caribbean. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 NASDAQ vs. 
All Nasdaq-Eligible 
UK Listings 
  
NASDAQ vs.  
LSE AIM 
  
NASDAQ vs. 
LSE Main Market 
 
      
EU 0.016  -2.316  0.857 
      
Emerging 0.900  2.623c  -0.596 
      
CodeLaw -0.740  2.050  -0.889 
      
Socialist -1.436  11.715  -1.079 
      
Diff_Liquidity 1.858a  -0.232  2.666b 
      
Diff_IndexReturns -0.665  -1.772  3.143 
      
Diff_P/E_Index -0.124  1.212b  -0.513 
      
Diff_DomesticList 2.007a  1.338a  2.139c 
      
NonExchUSList 1.231a  0.923b  2.347 
      
Big5 2.247a  2.146a  2.229 
      
Issuance_Home -0.997  -0.753  -2.260 
      
Issuance_Host 0.988b  0.952c  0.052 
      
Diff_Trade 0.221  0.217  0.075 
      
Log(Assets) 0.168  0.660a  -1.540 
      
ROA -0.333  -1.031  0.756 
      
Log(1+BTM) 0.191  0.108  0.173 
      
PostSOX 1.647  -3.994a  2.023c 
      
Industry / Geography Indicators Included  Included  Included 
      
Chi-squared: Log Likelihood Ratio 667.2a  516.1a  523.8a 
Percent Concordant 97.6%  98.3%  99.2% 
Number of observations 688  584  529 
(U.S. / London) (425 / 263)  (425 / 159)  (425 / 104) 
      
a,b,c The estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the probability of a foreign listing conditional on raising 
capital in the host country 
 
This table presents select coefficients from various logistic estimations of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU + β5Emerging  
+ β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_IndexReturns + β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList  
 
+ β12log(NonExchUSList) + β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Diff_Trade 
 
+ β16log(Assets) + β17ROA + β18log(1+BTM) + β19PostSOX + ε 
 
The sample consists of 1,021 unique U.S. and U.K. foreign listings between June 1995 and June 2006.  The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the foreign firm listed onto either the NASDAQ or the 
NYSE; zero if the foreign firm listed onto either the London Stock Exchanges’ Main Market or AIM. The first 
(second) estimation includes all foreign firms that raise (did not raise) capital in the host market in the one month 
period surrounding the listing date.  The indicator variables Canada, Ireland and Israel (coefficients not presented ) 
are equal to one if the firm is domiciled in Canada, Ireland or Israel, respectively.  The array Geography is a set of 
three indicator variables that captures the firm’s domicile in three broad geographic regions: Asia, Latin / South 
America and the Caribbean. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 Equity Issuance  No Equity Issuance 
 
    
EU 1.207  0.635 
    
Emerging -1.991a  -1.784a 
    
CodeLaw -0.871  -1.767a 
    
Socialist 14.508  -2.386a 
    
Diff_Liquidity 2.943a  -0.052 
    
Diff_IndexReturns 3.293  -0.432 
    
Diff_P/E_Index -1.842  0.441 
    
Diff_DomesticList 0.771  1.001a 
    
NonExchUSList 1.463a  0.312 
    
Big5 2.319b  1.276a 
    
Issuance_Home 1.877  -0.790 
    
Diff_Trade 0.149  0.301b 
    
Log(Assets) 1.508a  0.350a 
    
ROA 1.816  -0.165 
    
Log(1+BTM) -0.166  -0.080 
    
PostSOX -2.057b  -1.681a 
    
Industry / Geography Indicators Included  Included 
    
Chi-squared: Log Likelihood Ratio 281.6a  389.9a 
Percent Concordant 98.2%  92.5 
Number of observations 353  668 
(U.S. / London) (272 / 81)  (486 / 182) 
    
a,b,c The estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed). 
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Table 7 
Determinants of U.S. versus U.K. foreign listing before and after Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
This table presents select coefficients from various logistic estimations of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
Prob(U.S. Listing=1) = α + ∑ γ
=
9
1j
j
jInd + λkGeographyk
k=1
3∑ + β1Canada + β2Ireland + β3Israel + β4EU + β5Emerging  
+ β6CodeLaw + β7Socialist + β8Diff_Liquidity + β9Diff_IndexReturns + β10Diff_P/E_Index + β11Diff_DomesticList  
 
+ β12log(NonExchUSList) + β13Big5 + β14Issuance_Home + β15Issuance_Host + β16Diff_Trade 
 
+ β17log(Assets) + β18ROA + β19log(1+BTM) + β20PostSOX + ε 
 
The sample consists of 1,021 unique U.S. and London foreign listing events between June 1995 and June 2006 with 
sufficient financial and market value data to estimate the full model.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the foreign firm listed onto either the NASDAQ or the NYSE; zero if the firm listed onto either the 
London Stock Exchanges’ Main Market or AIM.  The Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period captures all foreign listing events 
between June 1995 and April 2002; the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period captures all foreign listing events between 
August 2002 and June 2006.  All of the independent variables are defined in Tables 1 and 3. 
 
     Difference 
 Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
(June 1995–April 2002) 
 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
(August 2002-June 2006) 
 PostSox - PreSox 
Chi-Squared (p-value) 
      
Industry / Geography Indicators Included  Included   
      
EU 1.287b  -2.090c  7.230 (0.007) 
      
Emerging -2.547a  -1.718b  0.873 (0.350) 
      
CodeLaw -1.193b  0.614  3.073 (0.079) 
      
Socialist -0.421  -0.127  0.020 (0.888) 
      
Diff_Liquidity 0.203  0.237  0.004 (0.953) 
      
Diff_IndexReturns -1.580  1.312  1.834 (0.176) 
      
Diff_P/E_Index 0.364  0.559  1.074 (0.300) 
      
Diff_DomesticList 1.275a  0.467  3.999 (0.046) 
      
NonExchUSList 0.125  0.504c  0.668 (0.414) 
      
Big5 1.908a  1.441a  0.333 (0.564) 
      
Issuance_Home -0.075  -1.235  1.501 (0.221) 
      
Issuance_Host 1.283a  0.644  1.278 (0.258) 
      
Diff_Trade 0.810a  0.079  6.487 (0.011) 
      
Log(Assets) 0.247a  0.765a  8.271 (0.004) 
      
ROA 0.655  0.426  0.038 (0.846) 
      
Log(1+BTM) -0.034  -0.175  0.055 (0.816) 
      
Chi-squared: Log Likelihood Ratio 275.2a  209.1   
Percent Concordant 93.3%  91.7%   
Number of observations 703  318   
(U.S. / London) (610 / 93)  (148 / 170)   
      
a,b,c The estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed). 
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Table 8 
Trends in listing behavior given the historical determinants of exchange listing choice 
 
This table presents information about actual and predicted foreign listing activity following the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley for the sub-sample of firms with sufficient financial data to estimate and utilize the full pre-SOX 
prediction model.  Panel A provides evidence on the projected and actual listing rates in the post-SOX period, as 
well as an indication of the expected percentage of U.S. (versus U.S.) listings, for the sample of 318 foreign firms 
with sufficient financial data. Differences in monthly listing rates are tested using a t-test of means; differences in 
the percent of U.S. listings are tested using a binomial test of means.   Panel B presents average characteristics for 
foreign firms predicted to list on U.S. exchanges post-SOX, conditional on their actual exchange choice.  Panel C 
presents average characteristics for foreign firms predicted to list on U.K. exchanges post-SOX, conditional on their 
actual exchange choice.  All variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Actual and projected U.S. listing activity using pre-SOX determinants  
 
 Decline in listing frequencies due to 
changing composition of foreign firms 
 Decline in listing frequencies due to change 
in listing incentives  
 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX   Post-SOX Post-SOX  
U.S. Listing information: Actual Predicted Difference  Predicted Actual Difference 
        
Total Foreign Listings: 703 318 -  318 318 - 
        
Number of U.S. listings: 610 218 -  218 148 - 
Number of U.K. listings: 93 100 -  100 170 - 
        
Percent U.S. Listings 0.862 0.686 -0.176  0.686 0.465 -0.221 
(t-statistic)   (-6.89)    (-5.45) 
        
 
Panel B: Characteristics of foreign firms predicted to list on U.S exchange post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
partitioned by actual exchange choice 
 
   Predicted U.S. Listing    Specific U.K. Exchange  
         
Actual Listing:  U.S. Listing  U.K. Listing  AIM  Main 
         
MVE  1,283.66  425.15a  139.50  1,639.29 
         
Assets  2,766.47  762.01c  108.53  3,414.36 
         
Sales  865.26  327.33b  33.14  1,486.78 
         
ROA  -0.008  -0.044  -0.066  0.045 
         
BTM  0.494  0.544  0.558  0.486 
         
Big5  0.955  0.826a  0.797  0.941 
         
Issuance_Home  0.083  0.058  0.058  0.059 
         
Issuance_Host  0.470  0.430  0.420  0.471 
         
Diff_Trade  1.028  0.887  0.857  1.008 
         
CommonLaw  0.795  0.779  0.855  0.471 
         
CodeLaw  0.159  0.186  0.145  0.353 
         
Emerging  0.606  0.384a  0.333  0.588 
         
Number of listings:  132  86  69  17 
         
a,b,c  The difference in mean characteristic between firms that listed on the predicted exchange and those firms that 
did not is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level using a two-tailed t-test of means. 
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Table 8 
Trends in listing behavior given the historical determinants of exchange listing choice 
 
 
Panel C: Characteristics of foreign firms predicted to list on U.K exchange post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
partitioned by actual exchange choice 
 
   Predicted U.K. Listing    Specific U.S. Exchange  
Actual Listing:  U.K. Listing  U.S. Listing  NASDAQ  NYSE 
         
MVE  549.24  1,537.35c  238.17  3,022.13 
         
Assets  503.64  8,136.26a  343.34  18,155.73 
         
Sales  402.56  1,728.23b  258.75  3,617.56 
         
ROA  -0.140  0.114b  0.122  0.103 
         
BTM  0.566  0.471  0.464  0.480 
         
Big5  0.393  0.750a  0.777  0.714 
         
Issuance_Home  0.107  0.063  0.111  0.000 
         
Issuance_Host  0.298  0.313  0.444  0.143 
         
Diff_Trade  -0.220  0.117c  0.167  0.052 
         
CommonLaw  0.857  0.438a  0.444  0.429 
         
CodeLaw  0.119  0.438a  0.556  0.286 
         
Emerging  0.381  0.938a  1.000  0.857 
         
Number of listings:  84  16  9  7 
         
a,b,c  The difference in mean characteristic between firms that listed on the predicted exchange and those firms that 
did not is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level using a two-tailed t-test of means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
